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Victims’ Rights from a Restorative Perspective
Lara Bazelon & Bruce A. Green
The criminal adjudicatory process is meant in part to help crime victims heal. But for some crime
victims, the process is re-victimizing. For decades, efforts have been made to make the criminal
process fairer and more humane for victims. For example, state and federal laws are now designed
to keep victims informed, allow them to be heard at sentencing, and afford them monetary restitution.
But these efforts, while important, have not persuaded crime victims to trust criminal process. For
example, sexual assaults remain grossly under-reported and under-prosecuted. Less than 1 percent
of sexual assault crimes result in a felony conviction. Even the few victims who do receive their
promised retributive outcome are not necessarily healed by the process.
Reform efforts seem to presuppose that victims of crime – or victims of particular crimes such as
sexual assault – are essentially the same and have essentially the same need, namely, a need for the
offender to be criminally prosecuted and sent to prison to serve the longest sentence the law allows.
However, sexual assault victims are a diverse group – racially, ethnically, socio-economically, and
with respect to sexual identity – and they suffer varied harms because sexual assault encompasses a
wide realm of misconduct and victim-offender relationships or lack thereof. Even when victims suffer
similar harms and come from similar backgrounds, they often have distinct, though sometimes
overlapping, needs and objectives. Some have no desire to participate in the criminal adjudication
process at all. Some will be re-traumatized by a successful criminal prosecution, even with the
implementation of procedural reforms promoted by the victims’ rights movement and others.
Proceeding from the premise that victims are a diverse group with differing needs, we focus on
victims who might prefer, and be better served by, a non-adversarial process that is centered on their
needs, namely, restorative justice. However much improved, adversarial adjudication directed at
convicting and incarcerating offenders risks re-traumatizing victims rather than promoting healing.
It denies victims any significant control over the process, including control over their own narratives.
We explore the value of restorative justice processes as an alternative that, in many criminal cases,
may be preferable from victims’ perspective. We acknowledge that restorative justice processes are
rarely employed in sexual assault cases in the United States and that prosecutors may have reasons,
independent of victims’ perceived interests, for preferring the adversary process, a criminal
conviction and imprisonment. Further, some victims’ advocates regard restorative justice as
particularly inappropriate in the context of sexual assaults. Nonetheless, we suggest that when
victims voluntarily choose to engage in a restorative justice process, it may be healing, because it
gives victims agency in seeking a reckoning that fits with their particular needs and offers
possibilities for addressing and repairing the harm that a criminal prosecution cannot.
INTRODUCTION
The victims’ rights movement has made great strides to improve the adjudicatory process for
crime victims in the United States: they are now entitled to notification of court proceedings, 1 the
1

See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4406 (2017) (“On becoming aware of the date, time and place of
1
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right to seek monetary compensation from offenders, 2 and the opportunity to make a victim impact
statement, 3 among other rights. But procedural reforms, including new ones inspired by the
#MeToo movement, 4 cannot alter the fundamentally adversarial nature of our criminal justice
system, which disempowers victims 5 and has a significant potential to re-traumatize them at
precisely the time when the state should be helping them heal. 6 Crimes involving sexual assault
have a particular potential to re-harm victims because the adjudicatory process keeps its focus
squarely on the offender and subordinates the interests all other actors to achieving a conviction and
retributive outcome. Most sexual assaults are never reported. 7 If a criminal case is initiated,
control over the victim’s narrative as well as every major decision about the case is ceded to the

the initial appearance of the accused, the law enforcement agency shall inform the victim of that
information unless the accused appeared in response to a summons or writ of habeas corpus. In that
case, the prosecutor’s office shall, on receiving that information, provide the notice to the victim.”);
see also § 13-4409(A) (“Except as provided in subsection B, the court shall provide notice of criminal
proceedings, for criminal offenses filed by information, complaint or indictment, except initial
appearances and arraignments, to the prosecutor’s office at least five days before a scheduled
proceeding to allow the prosecutor’s office to provide notice to the victim.”).
2
The federal Victim and Witness Protection Act, for example, provides that the court may order
restitution for the “cost of necessary medical and related professional services . . . [and] for lost
income.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1) (2008). Note, however, that courts have interpreted this statute as
excluding restitution for “mental anguish and suffering.” United States v. Husky, 924 F.2d 223, 226–
27 (11th Cir. 1991).
3
In Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Eighth
Amendment allows the prosecution to introduce a victim impact statement at the sentencing phase of
a capital case because it is “relevant evidence” to the determination whether impose the death penalty.
See generally Robert C. Davis & Carrie Mulford, Victims’ Rights and New Remedies: Finally Giving
Victims Their Due, 24 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. L. 198 (May 2008).
4
Alta Viscomi, System Accountability and Sexual Violence: The Past and Future of the Criminal
Justice System, 22 RICH. PUB. INT. L. REV. 173, 181–88 (2019) (noting “the often brutal nature of the
court confrontation process” continues in the post #MeToo era as do the barriers victims, particularly
women of color, face in providing their cases).
5
Linda G. Mills, The Justice of Recovery: How the State Can Heal the Violence of Crime, 57
HASTINGS L.J. 457, 460–61 (2006) (“Critics of the victims’ rights movement, however, question the
substance of [rape law reforms], noting that victim participation in criminal trials is largely symbolic.
Moreover, courtroom dynamics subscribe a passive role to victims, who perform only when the
prosecutor and the law invite such participation.”).
6
See generally SUSAN HERMAN, PARALLEL JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME (2010).
7
Amy Kasparian, Justice Beyond Bars: Exploring the Restorative Justice Alternative for Victims of
Rape and Sexual Assault, 37 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 377 (2014) (stating that “[t]he reforms of
the past forty years” are little more than “symbolic steps” and that most rape and sexual assault
remain unreported and unprosecuted); Alta Viscomi, System Accountability and Sexual Violence: The
Past and Future of the Criminal Justice System, 22 RICH. PUB. INT. L. REV. 173, 180–81 (2019)
(citing statistics).
2
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state. 8 The vast majority of cases end in plea bargains, 9 which may leave victims dissatisfied
because they never had a chance to tell their story and because the bargain itself may seem unfair or
unrepresentative of what happened to them. 10 In the rare case where there is a trial, the victim’s
narrative is shaped by prosecutor, the victim must undergo cross-examination by the defense
attorney, and the matter of punishment is up to the judge. 11
Our inquiry focuses on the harms that victims experience during criminal adjudication through
trial and sentencing. Victims’ reform efforts tend to “essentialize” crime victims, that is, to regard
them as if they are essentially the same and have essentially the same needs and objectives. 12 But
crime victims – and even victims of particular crimes -- are not a monolithic group. 13 Sexual assault
victims, in particular, are diverse across racial, ethnic, socio-economic lines; some are members of
LGBTQ groups, some are men. 14 The sexual violence they experience includes a wide array of
8

See Mills, supra note 5, at 458–62.
Innocence Staff, Guilty Pleas on the Rise, Criminal Trials on the Decline, INNOCENCE PROJECT
(Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.innocenceproject.org/guilty-pleas-on-the-rise-criminal-trials-on-thedecline/ (“Over the last 50 years, defendants chose trial in less than three percent of state and federal
criminal cases—compared to 30 years ago when 20 percent of those arrested chose trial. The
remaining 97 percent of cases were resolved through plea deals.”); Jon Stinchcomb, Most Sexual
Assault Cases Don’t Go To Trial. Here’s Why., PORT CLINTON NEWS HERALD (Aug. 24, 2018),
https://www.portclintonnewsherald.com/story/news/local/2018/08/24/ohio-sexual-assault-cases-trialsentencing-plea-deal/978088002/.
10
DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON 32-33 (2019) (explaining why a plea to a lesser charge “can
feel profoundly disrespectful to [the victim’s] experience”).
11
Mills, supra note 5, at 460–61.
12
Aya Gruber defines “essentialism” as “the practice of treating certain ‘groups,’ whether racial,
socio-economic, or ethnic, as though they all share the same beliefs, traits, goals, and desires.” Aya
Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 774–45 (2007). Essentialism, Gruber
writes, also operates from a reductionist view of the offender: “Defendants are subhuman; they are
monsters.” Id. at 775.
13
Kathryn Castell, Julia Wolfe & Mai Nguyen, What We Know About Victims of Sexual Assault in
America, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 21, 2018), https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/sexual-assaultvictims/.
14
Victims seared into the public consciousness include Trish Meili, in the infamous 1989 Central Park
Jogger case, and Catherine “Kitty” Genovese, who was sexually assaulted and ultimately killed a street
near her home in 1964. Both victims were white, attractive, and middle class. Their attackers were
men of color with violent criminal histories who they did not know. In Meili’s case, the prosecution
charged and wrongfully convicted five black and Hispanic teenagers. Years later, Matias Reyes, who
is Puerto Rican, and had raped numerous other women in stranger attacks, confessed to the crime.
Alfred Joyner, Who is Matias Reyes? Serial rapist and Murderer in the Central Park Five Series
When They See Us, Newsweek, June 4, 2019. His DNA matched the DNA from the crime scene. Jim
Dwyer, The True Story of how a City in Fear Brutalized the Central Park Five, New York Times,
May 30, 2019. A black man named Winston Moseley was arrested and convicted for the sexual
assault and murder of Genovese. Some experts believe that his confession was coerced. Saul Kassin,
The Killing of Kitty Genovese: What Else Does this Case Tell Us? 12 Perspectives on Psychological
Science TKK, 374-381 (2017).
9
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crimes—misdemeanors and felonies, stranger attacks and assaults by people they know. Even victims
who experience similar harms and come from similar backgrounds may have a multiplicity of needs
that go unmet even under the “best case scenario” where there is a conviction and severe sentence. We
explore how the criminal process can serve the victims who want no part of the adversary process, not
by promising to reduce the traumatic nature of criminal prosecutions to a tolerable level –which is not
always possible – but by acknowledging that for some victims, there may be a different and preferable
path. Empirical data suggests that for many survivors, the road to recovery involves “regaining power
and control over what occurs in the aftermath of an assault, including the ability to make choices
about when, how, and with whom to share their story, and the ability to limit their exposure to
situations that may cause flashbacks or re-traumatization.” 15
The criminal justice system, by design, is not set up to provide this kind of choice and
empowerment. As the criminologist Lisa Frohmann has noted, “Under current legal practice, the
victim’s affective and personal concerns are secondary to the concerns of the organization. To
elevate the priority of victims’ concerns, to have them play a more active . . . role in the processing of
sexual assault complaints, major structural and ideological changes in the legal system would have to
occur.” 16 Yet the adjudicative process cannot accommodate such changes, which would radically
undermine basic constitutional guarantees, including the right of the accused to present a defense and
to confront and cross-examine witnesses. 17 Empowering victims would also be contrary to the
traditional understanding of prosecutors’ role and responsibility to seek justice, which requires
declining to prosecute cases that cannot be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and determining
whether the public interest demands a result different from what the victim desires. 18
15

Stefanie Mundhenk Harrelson, I Was Sexually Assaulted. And I Believe Incarcerating Rapists
Doesn’t Help Victims Like Me, THE APPEAL (July 18, 2019), https://theappeal.org/i-was-sexuallyassaulted-and-i-believe-incarcerating-rapists-doesnt-help-victims-like-me/ (citing Judith Lewis
Herman, Justice From the Victim’s Perspective, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 571-602 (2005)), .
16
Lisa Frohmann, Constituting Power in Sexual Assault Cases: Prosecutorial Strategies for Victim
Management, 45 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 393 (1998).
17
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62–63 (2004)
(“Dispensing with cross examination because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing
with jury trial because the defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment
prescribes.”); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320 (1974) (“The state’s interest in protecting the
confidentiality of a juvenile offender’s record cannot require yielding of so fundamental a
constitutional right as the effective cross examination for bias of an adverse witness”).
18
See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORD. URB. L.J. 607 (1999); see
also STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-1.2(c) (AM. BAR. ASS’N. 1993); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt (AM. BAR. ASS’N. 2008) (The “seek justice” imperative is referred to as a “higher
duty,” which requires the prosecutor to serve as “a minister of justice and not simply . . . an
advocate”). While this requirement is somewhat vague, it does “tell[] prosecutors that their role
includes more than seeking conviction at all costs.” Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional
Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 223, 259 (1993); Paul H. Robinson, Should the Victims’ Rights Movement Have Influence
Over Criminal Law Formulation and Adjudication, 33 MCGEORGE L REV. 749, 749 (2002) (tying
case outcomes to an objective measure of blameworthiness not an individual victim’s need for
retribution or lack thereof); Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel
4
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In part, our inquiry offers a frank assessment of the limitations of criminal procedure in the
United States viewed from crime victims’ perspective. By its nature, the adversary process denies
victims autonomy and puts them at risk of further psychological harm and invasion of privacy. While
procedural reforms may enhance victims’ participation or reduce the intrusiveness of direct and crossexamination, many victims will continue to find the process inhospitable if not painful. We also
critique the victims’ rights efforts insofar as they fail to acknowledge important differences among
crime victims. This movement overlooks those who seek to avoid the criminal process because they
will not be healed, but expect only to be further harmed, by a criminal prosecution, even one that
results in the offender’s conviction and incarceration. We then explore whether there are other ways
to advocate for victims, specifically victims of sexual assault, outside of the traditional criminal
justice system, that may provide better opportunities to exert agency and promote healing. We focus
on one of these alternatives, restorative justice, and discuss how it might apply in sexual assault
cases. 19 Notably, while other countries have used restorative justice in cases involving violent
crimes, there is little data on its effectiveness with respect to sexual assault crimes in particular. 20
Within the United States, restorative justice is rarely employed in cases involving violent crime and
Vision, 49 HOWARD L.J. 475, 483 (2006) (“The duty to act as a zealous advocate and the duty to act
as a minister of justice are not contiguous: some tension between them seems inevitable.”).
19

We make this inquiry mindful of its controversial nature. Those who advocate for restorative
justice in sexual assault cases, including survivors, have been subjected to public condemnation and
ridicule. See, e.g., Harrelson, supra note 14 (writing that “talking about restorative justice as a
solution to rape instead of incarceration has resulted in me being called ‘stupid,’ ‘naive,’
‘malevolent,’ and a ‘bitch’”).
20
Countries including Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom have used restorative justice
practices in response to violent crime with positive results: a lower rate of recidivism and higher rate
of satisfaction from the victims. Heather Strang & Lawrence W. Sherman, Repairing the Harm:
Victims and Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 15 (discussing a decade of “research and
development work on restorative justice in the common law jurisprudence of Australia and England”
and reporting that victims stated they got “more ‘justice’” from the restorative process than the
traditional legal system); Mark S. Umbreit, Robert B. Coates & Betty Vos, The Impact if VictimOffender Mediation: Two Decades of Research, 65 FEDERAL PROBATION 29–38 (2001) (reporting the
same over two decades). Currently, there are only a few projects scattered across the United States
that apply restorative justice practices in cases of serious violent crime (excluding sexual violence),
but these have shown promising results. See, e.g., Danielle Sered, A New Approach to Victim
Services: The Common Justice Demonstration Project, 24 FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER 50
(2011) (describing a restorative justice program that diverts violent offenders in New York).
Vermont has a statute making it a “state policy” to “develop and employ restorative justice
approaches whenever feasible and responsive to specific criminal acts.” But the law carves out an
exception for sexual assault related crimes. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 1967 (2018). In 2018, however,
“Vermont created a restorative justice study committee” to re-examine whether restorative justice
might be used in sexual assault cases. Cara Kelly & Aaron Hegarty, #MeToo was a culture shock.
But changing laws will take more than a year., USA TODAY (Oct. 5, 2018),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/investigations/2018/10/04/metoo-me-too-sexual-assaultsurvivors-rights-bill/1074976002/.
5
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almost never in sexual assault cases, 21 making data hard to come by. 22 For this reason, our discussion
of restorative justice and sexual assault is necessarily preliminary—a further step in what we hope
will be an ongoing and increasingly data-backed as well as story-driven exploration.
This article contributes to a collection of articles responding to the effects of the #MeToo
movement on criminal law and procedure. It seeks to add not only to the literature on victims’ rights
and the role of restorative justice in the criminal process in general, but also to the literature in
particular on how sexual offense victims should be treated in the criminal process. This question
takes on added significance given the #MeToo Movement’s success in broadening public
understanding of the harms caused by sex offenses and in encouraging more rigorous prosecution of
sex offenders, 23 to which some states have responded by reforming their laws to create new crimes,
increase penalties, and extend statutes of limitations to bring suit and file charges. 24 Like earlier
reform efforts designed to help crime victims, the #MeToo Movement focuses predominantly on
punishing offenders: it envisions criminal trials as a forum in which women who are victims of sexual
offenses can regain their voices and where guilty verdicts will serve as affirmations of victims’
experiences, facilitating healing. 25 Our objective is not to deny the restorative power of successful
prosecutions for some victims, but to question whether criminal prosecutions best serve victims in all
cases, and to contrast criminal adjudication with processes that are more explicitly designed to be
restorative for victims. Ultimately, we seek to expand the national discourse by encouraging
21

One exception is RESTORE, a federally funded pilot program in Pima County, Arizona that
operated from 2004-2007. In all, 22 misdemeanor and felony sexual assault cases were referred by
prosecutors to the program. Repeat sexual offenders were excluded as were those accused of
domestic violence. Mary P. Koss, The RESTORE Program of Restorative Justice for Sex Crimes:
Vision, Process, and Outcomes, 29 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 10–12 (2013),
https://publichealth.arizona.edu/sites/publichealth.arizona.edu/files/14%2004%2024%20RESTORE%
20On-line%20published.pdf [hereinafter Koss, The RESTORE Program]. Koss’s peer-reviewed
published report analyzing RESTORE’s data found that two-thirds of felony-referred defendants and
91 percent of misdemeanor-referred defendants successfully completed the program and that 90
percent of all participants believed that “justice was done.” Id.
22
Id. (stating that “scholarly discourse on RJ for sexual assault has been hindered by lack of empirical
data and is predominantly conceptual and dialectic”).
23
See, e.g., Lesley Wexler, Jennifer Robbennolt & Colleen Murphy, #MeToo, Time’s Up, and
Theories of Justice, 2019 Ill. L. Rev. 45, 49-68 (2019).
24
Holly R. Lake, #MeToo Movement’s Law and Policy Impact on Hollywood, 42 MAY L.A.-Law
(2019); Corina Knoll, “I Can Still Smell Him,” For 4 Legislators the Child Victims Act is Personal,
NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 21, 2019); Sami Sparber, Texas Toughens Penalties For Groping, Houston
Chronicle, June 4, 2019.
25
Two notable responses to this movement were the prosecution of Larry Nassar, in which more than
100 victims testified at his sentencing following his guilty plea, and the New York prosecution of
Jeffrey Epstein, at which the judge allowed putative victims to give similar testimony following
Epstein’s death in prison before a trial could commence. Both victim impact proceedings were
controversial – the Epstein proceeding especially so. See Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe,
Punishment Without Process: “Victim Impact” Proceedings for Dead Defendants, Fordham Law
Review Online, vol. 88 (2019), http://fordhamlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/GreenRoiphe_November_FLRO_4.pdf.
6
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thoughtful consideration of reparative alternatives, such as restorative justice processes, that are not
solely concerned with punishment but rather emphasize accountability and healing.
I.

Background: The Development of Victims’ Rights Laws

A. Early Efforts to Reform the Adjudicatory Process to Benefit Crime Victims
In the United States, organized efforts have been made for more than a century to improve the
criminal justice process from victims’ perspective. 26 Some of the efforts have focused on victims of
particular crimes, such as sexual assault or domestic violence, and others have focused on crime
victims as a class. Some of the focus is on improving social services and other assistance to crime
victims. But much of the focus, and the subject of our discussion, concerns ameliorating the harms to
victims caused not so much by the crime but by the ensuing criminal adjudicative process.
Like the current #MeToo Movement, some early reform efforts specifically targeted how the
criminal laws and processes unfairly treated women who are victims of sexual assault. In the 1970s,
many states did not recognize spousal rape, required that victims prove they physically resisted, were
unlikely to prosecute date rape, and allowed cross examinations so broad as to place the victim’s
unrelated sexual history and choice of clothing on trial to imply that her “promiscuity” or
provocativeness was in some way the cause of what had happened to her.27 Reform efforts targeted
these problems. 28
But what came to be known as the victims’ rights movement tended to focus more broadly on
problems that were not specific to sexual assault cases. For example, other than via their testimony,
scripted by the process, victims were voiceless – they did not speak at sentencing and had no right to
be informed about the progress of their case as it wended its way through the system. Reformers
recognized that in seeking to vindicate the interests of crime victims as well as the public generally,
the traditional way of prosecuting criminal cases, including but not limited to sexual assault cases,
often caused even greater misery for victims. 29 In 1980, Wisconsin adopted the first Crime Victims’
Bill of Rights, 30 which was designed to address these problems, and other states eventually followed.
Among the most significant milestones in promoting victims’ procedural interests in the
adjudicative process, as well as more broadly, was President Reagan’s appointment of a Task Force
26

See OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, LANDMARKS IN VICTIMS' RIGHTS AND SERVICES (2018),
https://ovc.ncjrs.gov/ncvrw2018/info_flyers/2018NCVRW_Landmarks_508.pdf.
27
CITES
28
CITES
29
Ronet Bachman & Raymond Paternoster, A Contemporary Look at the Effects of Rape Law
Reform: How Far Have We Come? 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 554, 555 (1993) (describing “a
fragile alliance among feminist groups, victims’ rights groups, and organizations promoting more
general ‘law and order’ themes” to combat stereotypes about “real rape,” the historical tendency to
blame women and the common practice of putting a woman’s sexual history on trial during cross
examination).
30
See Dean G. Kilpatrick, Interpersonal Violence and Public Policy: What About the Victims?, 32 J.
L. MED. & ETHICS 73, 77–78 (2004) (providing overview of the crime victims’ rights movement).
7
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on Victims of Crime, which issued a 1982 report recommending 68 new programs, policies, practices
and other measures, including a constitutional amendment guaranteeing crime victims “the right to be
present and to be heard at all critical stages of judicial proceedings.”31 The report helped energize and
chart the course of law reform efforts that have continued to this day. 32
From the start, the focus of victims’ rights efforts has been on employing and improving the
criminal adjudicative process, on the assumption that victims, including sexual assault victims, are best
served when offenders are prosecuted, convicted and punished harshly. While healing victims was
important, reform efforts presupposed that punishing offenders was essential to healing. 33 The
retributive preferences of the victims’ rights movement in part reflect its history. The victims’ rights
movement developed in the context of a call for more prosecutions and harsher criminal punishment –
for the decades’-long “war on crime” waged by Republican and Democratic presidents alike. It was
that bipartisan movement that led to our current regime of mass incarceration, particularly of lowincome men of color. 34 The restorative justice movement was itself just getting started in the United
States in the 1970s and 1980s, when the victims’ rights movement was picking up steam. Even more
embryonic at that time was the push for diversion programs, problem-solving courts and other
alternatives to criminal prosecutions and punitive sentences.35
B. The 1982 Task Force Narrative of How the Adjudicatory Process Harms Crime Victims
From the outset, the law reform efforts of the victims’ rights movement, quite understandably,
has built on stories, portrayed to be the lived experience of crime victims and their families. Stories
have both explanatory and influential powers. But no single story or collection of stories captures the
vast, differing and, at times, seemingly contradictory, experiences, perceptions, desires and needs of
crime victims. The 1982 Task Force report responded to this challenge by constructing a fictional,
composite story of a survivor of a violent crime as she progressed through the criminal process
beginning with her report to the police. 36 The story was said to be based on interviews with crime
31

PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 17–115 (1982) [hereinafter
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE REPORT].
32
See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, Redefining Roles: The Victims’ Rights Movement, 3 UTAH L.
REV. 517, 528 (1985); Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim’s Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937,
943–53 (1985).
33
See, e.g., Steven J. Twist & Keelah E.G. Williams, Twenty-five Years of Victims’ Rights in
Arizona, 47 Ariz. St. L.J. 421, 446 (2015) (quoting 1990 speech of the founder of Mothers Against
Drunk Driving: “Victims don't want vengeance, they want healing; but there can be no healing until
justice is done.”).
34
See Michelle Alexander, THE NEW JIM CROW 13 (New York: New Press 2010) (describing mass
incarceration as a means to ensure “the subordinate status of a group defined largely by race”).
35
John S. Goldcamp, The Drug Court Response: Issues and Implications for Justice Change, 63 ALB.
L. REV., 923, 924–26 (2000) (charting the growth of drug treatment courts starting in the late 1980s);
Susan Daicoff, Law As A Healing Profession: “The Comprehensive Law Movement,” 6 PEPPERDINE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION L.J. 1 (2006) (stating that, at the close of the twentieth century, practitioners
grew disenchanted with the criminal justice system and created various types of problem solving
courts).
36
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 3–13.
8
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victims. 37 For some victims, the fictional account undoubtedly resonated with aspects of their own
experience. 38 But at the same time, the story was a caricature, in that many victims experienced none
of the indignities depicted by the Task Force and no victim could have experienced them all. 39 And
there are aspects of the story that seem extreme from today’s perspective, given the successes of the
law reform movement over the intervening decades.
The Task Force’s composite story depicts an “ordeal” that begins with indignities suffered by
the victim following a brutal rape by a stranger. In the composite story, the victim suffers further
violation at the hands of the police, a nurse in the hospital, and the press, which reports the crime. 40
The report describes the fictional victim’s susceptibility to harm or harassment by the attacker after he
is arrested. It then describes the impact on the victim as the adjudicative process progresses from a
preliminary hearing through trial, sentencing, appeal and, perhaps, retrial, with the prosecutor
inflicting pain, degradation, and inequities upon the victim. The criminal process goes on at length,
making it impossible for the victim to put the crime behind her and reconstruct her life. She submits
to repetitive questioning by the prosecutor and defense counsel, who make her relive the offender’s
attack in intimate detail; she is compelled to disclose private information that puts her at risk; and she
is subjected to an attack on her character. After the defendant is found guilty, there follows a
sentencing hearing in which the defense lawyer minimizes the injuries the offender inflicted, and the
sentencing judge denies the victim a chance to speak and announces a lenient sentence. Some
victims’ rights advocates have referred to the criminal adjudicatory process as a “second rape,” 41 and
the Task Force’s narrative lends credence to this characterization.
To redress the deficiencies described in its story, the Task Force made wide-ranging
recommendations directed at hospitals, the police, and the ministry, among others, 42 but most
importantly at the criminal adjudication process. The Task Force sought to counterbalance the liberal
tilt of Supreme Court’s criminal procedure decisions that many thought protected the rights of the
accused at the expense of justice for crime victims. 43 The Report’s recommendations for law reform
37

Id. at 2–3.
See, e.g., Roberta Roper Interview Transcript, UNIV. OF AKRON,
http://vroh.uakron.edu/transcripts/Roper.php (“I think the President’s Task Force . . . said it best.
Victims had little or no role to play if they were fortunate enough to survive the crime . . . . [T]here
were no rights for crime victims . . . . There were no services . . . . [W]e were literally on our
own . . . .”).
39
See Henderson, supra note 26, at 967 (“The scenario presented in the Final Report is indeed
horrifying. It is also somewhat incredible to anyone acquainted with criminal law practice, and it is
insulting to judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and law enforcement officers. It is a composite of
everything that could go wrong in the process, rather than a chronicle of an actual case. Yet the
scenario presented in the Final Report, and other horror stories like it, have led to numerous victim’s
rights proposals that purport to remedy the situation.”).
40
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 3–4.
41
Lee Madigan & Nancy C. Gamble, The Second Rape: Society’s Continued Betrayal of the Victim
97 (1991).
42
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 57–62, 89–96.
43
The application of the exclusionary rule in particular raised the ire of conservatives, including
Supreme Court Justices who found themselves in the minority. The Warren Court era rulings began
38
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included requiring that victims’ addresses be kept private; that victim counseling be privileged (not
subject to discovery); that hearsay be admissible in preliminary hearings so that victims need not
testify; that bail laws be made more stringent to protect crime victims during the pretrial period; that
victims be promptly notified about developments in their cases; that the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule be abolished; that witnesses be protected from intimidation; that victim impact
statements be required at sentencing; that judges’ sentencing discretion be limited; that harsher
sentences be imposed; that restitution be required; and that parole be abolished. 44 The Task Force
also directed recommendations to both prosecutors and judges. It encouraged prosecutors to: keep
victims apprised of the status of the case; bring victims’ views to the court’s attention; prosecute as
harshly as possible those who harass or intimidate victims or witnesses; and discourage continuances
to push cases to trial as quickly as possible. 45 It encouraged judges to: give equal weight to victims’
and witnesses’ interests as to those of the accused when ruling on requests for continuances; allow for,
and give appropriate weight to, crime victims’ input at sentencing; ordinarily order restitution to
victims who suffered financial loss; and ordinarily allow victims and their families to attend the trial
even if they will be witnesses. 46
To some extent, the Task Force’s recommendations were directed at preventing or mitigating
harms caused by the offender as a consequence of the commission of a violent crime. For example,
recommended measures designed to protect victims from harassment or to require convicted offenders
to make restitution were plainly aimed at preventing or addressing the offender’s blameworthy
conduct. But to a greater extent the recommendations were meant to prevent or mitigate harms
inflicted on the victim by the criminal process itself. For example, the Report recommended
protecting the confidentiality of psychological counseling, expanding the admissibility of hearsay to
reduce the need for victims’ testimony at a preliminary hearing, and assuring victims’ information
about ongoing proceedings and an opportunity to tell the sentencing judge about the impact of the
crime. 47
abating in the late 1970s after the election of Richard Nixon, who appointed four Justices who took a
less expansive view of criminal defendants’ rights. MICHAEL GRATEZ & LINDA GREENHOUSE, THE
BURGER COURT AND THE RISE OF THE JUDICIAL RIGHT (Simon & Schuster 2016). But the Supreme
Court still issued some controversial rulings that strictly applied the exclusionary rule, perhaps most
famously in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), where the defendant was convicted for
sexually assaulting, kidnapping, and murdering a young girl. By a 5-4 majority, the Court threw out
the defendant’s confession because it had been obtained in violation of the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, wrote that the defendant “is guilty of
the savage murder of a small child; no member of the Court contends he is not.” He continued,
“Today’s holding fulfills Judge (later Mr. Justice) Cardozo’s grim prophecy that someday some court
might carry the exclusionary rule to the absurd extent that its operative effect would exclude evidence
relating to the body of a murder victim because of the means by which it was found. In so ruling, the
Court regresses to playing a grisly game of ‘hide and seek,’ once more exalting the sporting theory of
criminal justice which has been experiencing a decline in our jurisprudence.” Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387, 415–16 (1977) (Burger, C.J. dissenting).
44
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 25, at 17–18.
45
Id. at 63–71.
46
Id. at 72–82.
47
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at __.
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Advocating for harsher punishments and more victim-centered protections carried particular
resonance in cases of rape and sexual assault. Prior to early 1980s, the history of prosecuting rape
and sexual assault was often one of blaming women, establishing evidentiary hurdles that made many
prosecutions impossible, and treating some sexual violations – with the important exception of a rape
allegation by a white woman against a black man 48 – as relatively minor or even non-criminal. 49
Through the mid-1970s, most state rape laws did not criminalize marital rape, and prosecutors
routinely made the distinction between “real rape” involving a stranger, and “date rape,” involving an
acquaintance. 50 Prosecutors were legally required to prove that the victim actively resisted, and to
demonstrate physical injury or provide other corroborating evidence. 51 In cases that went to trial,
victims were cross-examined extensively about their prior sexual history under the theory that it was a
“general reflection of [their] truthfulness” and “a supposed character trait for chastity.” 52 Under these
laws, women coming forward with rape accusations—with the important exception of white women
bringing allegations against black men 53—were disbelieved until they proved otherwise. Feminists
48

The swift conviction and often pre-conviction lynching of black men accused of sexually assaulting
white women has a long history in the United States dating back to slavery and continuing through
the middle of the twentieth century. See, e.g., SHERILYNN A. IFILL, ON THE COURTHOUSE LAWN:
CONFRONTING THE LEGACY OF LYNCHING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2007); LISA LINDQUIST
DORR, WHITE WOMEN, RAPE, AND THE POWER OF RACE IN VIRGINIA: 1900-1960 (2011). Often black
men were murdered by white mobs before their cases went to trial; or if they did go to trial, the trial
itself was a sham. To this day, black men are more likely to receive stiffer sentences and more likely
to be falsely convicted of rape than white men. Samuel P. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United
States 1989-2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMIN. 546, 551 (2003) (“Nobody should be surprised to find
bias and discrimination continuing to play a role in rape prosecutions”).
49
Estelle Freedman, Redefining Rape: The Struggle Against Sexual Violence in the Era of Suffrage
and Segregation 10, 21 (Harvard University Press 2013); Reporting Rates: Why Will Only 2 Out of
Every 100 Rapists Serve Time?, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NAT'L NETWORK,
https://www.rainn.org/get-information/statistics/reporting-rates (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
50
Ronet Bachman & Raymond Paternoster, A Contemporary Look at the Effects of Rape Law
Reform: How Far Have We Really Come?, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMIN. 554, 554–55 (1993).
51
Michelle J. Anderson, Women Do Not Report the Violence They Suffer: Violence Against Women
and the State Action Doctrine, 46 VILL. L. REV. 907, 924–25 (2001). The Model Penal Code issued
in 1962 required that an accuser demonstrate more than “token initial resistance.” Michelle J.
Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953, 966 (1998); Susan Estrich,
Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1105–32 (1986) (collecting cases).
52
Rebekah Smith, Protecting the Victim: Rape and Sexual Harassment Shields Under Maine and
Federal Law, 49 ME. L. REV. 443 (1997); Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and
Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 765–66 (1986).
53
N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial Black
Male, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1322–32 (2004) (charting the history of black men being portrayed
as bestial sexual predators, the prevalence of lynching black men accused of sex crimes against white
women, and what Professor Randall Kennedy calls the “legal lynching” of black men in court trials
devoid of due process); Frank Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar Masculinity: Intersectionality,
Assimilation, Identity, Performance, and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 853, 857 (2006)
(describing the entrenched stereotype of African American men as “animalistic, sexually depraved,
11
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working within the victims’ rights movement aimed to change that mindset, particularly when it came
to the orientation of prosecutors and judges.
C. Ensuing Decades of Reform Efforts
Although victims’ rights advocates have not succeeded in securing a federal constitutional
Victims’ Rights Amendment, 54 they have made significant progress in promoting state and federal
laws designed to promote crime victims’ interests.55 Some laws and other advances to assist crime
victims are not targeted specifically at the adjudicative procedure – for example, laws to establish and
fund social programs, counseling services and compensation for crime victims. 56 But, with victims’
interests at heart, other laws augment or alter the criminal adjudication process. These include state
and federal statutes and state constitutional amendments designed to ensure that crime victims are kept
abreast of developments in the case, can attend trials, and can give input to the prosecutor and the
sentencing judge. 57 Additionally, over the years, the Supreme Court, presumably influenced by the
victims’ rights movement, has issued various opinions interpreting constitutional provisions more
favorably to victims’ interests.58
As Marie Gottschalk explains in her book The Prison and the Gallows, “Women and women’s
organizations played a central role in the consolidation of this conservative victims’ rights movement
and crime prone”); Donna Coker, Crime Logic, Campus Sexual Assault, and Restorative Justice, 49
TEX. TECH. L. REV. 147, 168 (2016) (discussing racial bias that infects how black men are treated in
the criminal justice system and noting that “[a] number of scholars have expressed concern that racial
bias may affect outcomes in campus sexual assault adjudications” particularly when the accused is a
low-income black male athlete presumed to by “hypersexual” and a “thug”).
54
There are voluminous scholarly writings on proposed victims’ rights amendments, which have been
periodically debated in Congress. See, e.g., Chief Justice Richard Barajas & Scott A. Nelson, The
Proposed Crime Victims’ Federal Constitutional Amendment: Working Toward a Proper Balance, 49
BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (1987); Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates: A Reply to the Critics of the
Victims’ Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 479 (1999); Robert P. Mosteller, The Unnecessary
Victims’ Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 443 (1999); Steven J. Twist, The Crime Victims’
Rights Amendment and Two Good and Perfect Things, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 369 (1999).
55
Among the most demanding and extensive state laws concerning victims’ rights in the criminal
adjudicative process are those of Arizona and California. See Ariz. Victims’ Rights Implementation
Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-4401 et seq.; Ariz. Const., art. II, § 2.1; Cal. Const. art. I, § 28; see
generally Geoffrey Sant, “Victimless Crime” Takes on a New Meaning: Did California’s Victims’
Rights Amendment Eliminate the Right to Be Recognized as a Victim?, 39 J. LEGIS. 43 (2013); Steven
J. Twist & Keelah E.G. Williams, Twenty-Five Years of Victims' Rights in Arizona, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
421 (2015).
56
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 10601 (2008) (establishing Crime Victims Fund).
57
See, e.g., Justice for All Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. §3771 (2012); Victims’ Rights Clarification Act of
1997, S. 447, 105th Cong. (1997).; Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291,
Stat. 1248 (1982). See Kesha Handy, Federal Crime Victims’ Rights, 46 HOUSTON LAWYER 14
(2009).
58
See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990); South Carolina v. Gathers (1989); Booth v.
Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
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that emerged in the 1970s in the United States.” 59 With respect to sex offenses, perhaps the best
known reform to the adjudicatory process in the early years of the movement was the adoption of rape
shield laws, which place strict limits on the admissibility of evidence concerning a victim’s sexual
history. 60 By 1978, when Congress passed the Privacy for Protection of Rape Victims Act, half of the
states already had rape shield laws in place; the federal statute was seen as a model for those that did
not. 61 Today, courts generally cannot allow such evidence for the purpose of probing a victim’s
“character for truthfulness” or “lack of consent.” 62
From the perspective of crime victims in general, among the states thought to have the most
protective criminal procedure laws is California, with its incorporation of a victims’ bill of rights into
the state constitution and its strengthening of these provisions several years ago with the adoption of
Marsy’s Law. 63 The California state constitution now lists seventeen “personally held and enforceable
rights” of crime victims, among which are: the right to protect private information from discovery;
the right to refuse defense requests for discovery; the right to confer in advance with the prosecutor
about the charges and any pretrial disposition; the right to attend public proceedings; the right to be
heard at proceedings regarding (among other subjects) the defendant’s plea, sentence, and pretrial
release; the right to a speedy trial and a prompt and final conclusion of the case; the right to be
notified of material events in the case; the right to restitution; and the right to be informed of the
victim’s rights. 64
59

Marie Gottschalk, The Prison and The Gallows (Cambridge University Press 11 (2006).
FED. R. EVID. 412; National District Attorney’s Association, Rape Shield Statutes as of March
2011, https://ndaa.org/wp-content/uploads/NCPCA-Rape-Shield-2011.pdf (compiling state rape
shield laws) (last visited September 3, 2019); see generally Rebekah Smith, Protecting the Victim:
Rape and Sexual Harassment Shields under Maine and Federal Law, 49 ME. L. REV. 443, 457, 472
(1997) (describing the passage of the Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act by the U.S. Congress
in 1978, which established Federal Rule of Evidence 412, a federal rape shield statute, and enactment
of a similar state law in Maine); Dianne Obritsch, Utah Adopts Rule of Evidence 412: Prohibiting
Public Exposure of a Victim’s Sexual Past, 21 J. CONTEMP. L. 96, 96 (1995); National District
Attorney’s Association, Rape Shield Statutes as of March 2011, https://ndaa.org/wpcontent/uploads/NCPCA-Rape-Shield-2011.pdf (compiling state rape shield laws) (last visited
September 3, 2019).
61
Kathleen Winters, United States v. Shaw: What Constitutes An “Injury” Under the Federal Rape
Shield Statute, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 947, 967-86 & n.152 (1989).
62
Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act, Pub. L. No. 95-540, 92 Stat. 2046 (1978); FED. R. EVID.
412. Instead, past sexual history evidence is ordinarily admissible only to show: (1) the perpetrator
was someone other than the accused or (2) the existence of a pre-existing consensual sexual
relationship between the complaining witness and the defendant. There is a final catchall exception:
(3) evidence may be admitted if excluding it would violate the constitutional rights of the accused.
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991); Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirements to
Sexuality License: Sexual Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASHINGTON L. REV. 51,
55–56 (2002) (citing FED. R. EVID. 412).
63
See Cal. Const. art. I, § 28; see generally Ryan S. Appleby, Note, Proposition 9, Marsy's Law: An
Ill-Suited Ballot Initiative and the (Predictably) Unsatisfactory Results, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 321
(2013).
64
See Cal. Const. art. I, § 28
60
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With respect to sexual assault victims in particular, contemporary law-reform efforts are
directed, in part, at redressing procedural problems by reforming the substantive criminal law. For
example, to curtail sentencing judges’ discretion to impose lenient sentences, California enacted
legislation in 2016 imposing mandatory minimum sentences for sexual assault and prohibiting
probationary sentences in cases involving oral or vaginal penetration. 65 This was largely a response
to the notorious “Stanford rape case,” in which a white affluent college athlete who was convicted of
sexually assaulting an unconscious woman received a sentence of six months instead of the six years
requested by the prosecutor, prompting national outrage and the judge’s recall from office. 66
Reform efforts have gained momentum in the wake of the #MeToo movement; for example,
in 2019, New York passed the Child Victims Act, which extends the statute of limitations in sexual
assault cases. 67 Some post #MeToo efforts to reform the substantive law, particularly with regard to
sexual offenses, are meant to ameliorate the difficulty prosecutors conventionally encounter in
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the typical absence of witnesses other than the
accused and the accuser. 68 Recognizing that it is not feasible to undermine directly the presumption
of innocence, which is constitutionally protected and universally accepted, reformers have sought,
indirectly, to ease prosecutors’ burden of proof by redefining the conduct comprising sexual assault
under the criminal law: In particular, reformers have sought to criminalize sexual activity in the

65

CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 263.1, 1203.065.
See, Niraj Chokshi, After Stanford Case, California Governor Signs Bill Toughening Penalties for
Sexual Assault, NEW YORK TIMES (Sept. 30, 2016).
67
N.Y. SEN. B. 2440 (2019-2020), https://legislation.nysenate.gov/pdf/bills/2019/S2440 (last visited
Sept. 3, 2019); See Corina Knoll, “I Can Still Smell Him,” For 4 Legislators the Child Victims Act is
Personal, NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 21, 2019) (describing New York State’s passage of the Child
Victims Act in 2019, which extends the statute of limitations on sexual assault crimes so that
prosecutors can file charges up until the accused turns 28).
68
See, e.g., Mary Wood, City Attorney Shares the Reality of Prosecuting Sexual Assault Cases,
https://www.law.virginia.edu/news/2001_02/zug.htm (describing a presentation at the University of
Virginia School of Law by a veteran sex crimes prosecutor in Charlottesville, Virginia, who “said
rape cases are notoriously hard to try in part because of the burden of proof; there are usually only
two witnesses to the crime, the victim and the defendant”) (last visited on Sept. 3, 2019).
66
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absence of affirmative consent, 69 so as to align the normative expectations of the criminal law with
those of some university and college codes of student conduct. 70
D. Concluding Thoughts
As this brief history reflects, the movement to promote crime victims’ interests in the criminal
process is nowhere near completion. The work advanced by the 1982 Task Force to make the
criminal process more hospitable to crime victims continues, and efforts have also moved into new
directions. Overwhelmingly, however, criminal procedure reform takes criminal adjudication as a
given and presupposes that incarcerating offenders – what might be called the carceral solution – is
essential to redress the harm to their victims.
In the next Part of this article, we question this central premise of victims’ rights laws,
because in many cases, the criminal process both harms victims and deprives them of what they need:
agency after the ultimate experience of powerlessness, and healing from trauma. The traditional
adjudicatory process is an adversarial one. It must be, to comply with the guarantees provided to
criminal defendants in the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. It is not focused on and is often
irreconcilable with granting victims agency or a means of healing. The focus is squarely on the
defendant, who is incentivized to deny responsibility or minimize culpability to avoid a conviction or
obtain a more favorable plea offer. Competent counsel routinely advise clients to admit only the
barest facts necessary for the acceptance of a plea. The victim’s role is circumscribed, pre-scripted,
and limited to testifying when there is a trial and making a victim impact statement at sentencing.
While there may be some cathartic power to these acts, there is also harm, harm from the questioning
of the victim’s account during cross examination and defense counsel’s closing statement, and harm
from the silence or conflicting statements of the defendant in response to that testimony or to a victim
impact statement.

69

Beginning in 2012, the American Law Institute (ALI) debated whether to revise the Model Penal
Code’s definition which currently recognizes that consent to sexual activity may be “implied” – that
is, communicated through silence or lack of action. A proposed alternative would require
“affirmative consent,” which could be demonstrated only through words or actions. Letter from 100
ALI Members to ABA President Robert M. Carlson, Esq. (August 8, 2019). The proposal met with
“great controversy,” with some ALI members arguing that an affirmative consent standard
criminalized innocent conduct, including the “largely tacit ways that people engage in sexual
behavior in the real world.” Id. (citing to Professor Stephen Schulhofer’s Tentative Draft No. 2 (Apr.
2016)). In 2016, the ALI rejected the affirmative consent definition and instead adopted a Model
Penal Code definition of consent that included “both action and inaction.” A similar debate in the
American Bar Association is ongoing. Its governing body recently tabled a proposed resolution
urging “legislatures and courts to define consent in sexual assault cases as the assent of a person who
is competent to give consent to engage in a specific act of sexual penetration, oral sex, or sexual
contact, to provide that consent is expressed by words or action in the context of all of the
circumstances.” ABA Comm. on Domestic and Sexual Violence, Resolution 114 (year).
70
Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, American Bar Association Tables New Definition of Consent in Criminal
Sexual Assault Cases, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Aug. 14, 2019); KC Johnson & Stuart Taylor, Jr., Will the
ABA Reject Due Process?, WALL ST. JOURNAL (Aug. 11, 2019).
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II.

The Fundamental Harms Unaddressed or Under-Emphasized by Victims’ Rights
Laws

As previously discussed, the victims’ rights movement has sought in various ways to make the
criminal adjudicative process less hostile to crime victims. However, the movement, and the laws it
promoted, fail to address fundamental harms to victims that are inherent in our constitutionallyconstructed adversarial process of criminal adjudication aimed at identifying and punishing offenders.
We begin in Section A with a counter-narrative—a short composite story that serves as a counterpoint to the one on which the 1982 Task Force report built its recommendations. Drawing on our
alternative account, Part B briefly emphasizes five ways in which victims can be deeply harmed in
our adjudicative process as it is now constructed. Notwithstanding four decades of victims’ rights
reforms, victims are denied the opportunity to pursue restorative, rather than retributive, justice; they
are deprived of agency regarding the criminal prosecution and their role in it; they are denied control
in particular over their own voices and stories; they can be compelled to suffer psychological harm,
including self-harm, as witnesses; and both the prosecution and the defense can intrude into their
privacy, including into their confidential communications with therapists and other health care
professionals. Amidst all this they have no right to a lawyer to advocate for their interests and their
protection. Finally, Part C explains why these harms are unaddressed, or inadequately addressed, by
victims’ rights laws.
A. A Counter-Narrative of How the Adjudicatory Process Harms Crime Victims
The 1982 Task Force report could have told a different story, with different emphasis,
depicting how crime victims suffer in the criminal process. Emphasizing other harms may not have
led to a different set of recommendations, because other harms may seem irremediable or because
there may be no political will to address them. But a different story with a different emphasis might
have underscored the incompleteness of the proffered recommendations and the limited ability of
those recommendations, when implemented, to serve the needs of some victims. A different narrative,
focused on different needs and acknowledging the diversity among victims might have inspired a
search for an alternative to employing an adversarial means to a retributive end as the principal public
response to crime. Consider the following narrative. It, too, is extreme; purposefully so, to draw out
crucial contrasts with the Task Force narrative.
The victim was sexually assaulted by an acquaintance—in this case, by another student when
they were both intoxicated. They live in the same community and share a common set of friends.
They are both non-white, on full scholarship, come from under-served communities, and are the first in
their families to attend college. The assault the victim experienced was traumatic, and more trauma
was to follow.71
Initially, the victim was uncertain whether to report the offense. 72 She dreaded not only the
71

Her ensuing experience, while not universal, is common among crime victims. Similar experiences
may be shared by, among others, a minor who had a consensual sexual relationship with a young
adult, or a parent who was physically abused by a spouse or domestic partner, or a young man who
was shot or stabbed by a rivalrous member of the same community after a heated exchange of words.
72
Many crimes go unreported, including almost half of the crimes of gun violence and more than half
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reactions of her family and friends, and of the offender’s friends who were her acquaintances, and
how she would be treated by the police and other authorities, but also how she would be treated in
the criminal process if the offender were to be prosecuted and she were to be a witness. Many in her
situation would not report the offense. 73 But, perhaps supported by some of her friends or family,
she decided to do so.
Afterwards, however, as it became increasingly clear that her fears about her experience of the
criminal process would be realized, she regretted notifying the police and concluded that she did not
want a prosecution to go forward.74 In this jurisdiction, the prosecutor privileges the preferences of
certain crime victims who want to “drop the charges”: for example, the prosecutor would ordinarily
defer to a store owner who did not want to charge a shoplifter, whether because the owner was
motivated by sympathy or mercy for a member of the community who broke the law, seeking to
preserve the good will of other members of the community who are customers, or looking to avoid the
financial burden of having to serve as a witness. 75 But the prosecutor, while sympathetic to the
victim, questioned whether she appreciated what the criminal process offered, believing sincerely that
a prosecution and a conviction was in her best interest. 76
of property crimes. See generally U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2017, at 4, 7
(Dec. 2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv17.pdf. Rape and sexual assault are among the
most under-reported crimes. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT: REPORTING TO
POLICE AND MEDICAL ATTENTION, 1992-2000, at 1 (2002) (“Most rapes and sexual assaults against
females were not reported to the police. Thirty-six percent of rapes, 34% of attempted rapes, and
26% of sexual assaults were reported to police, 1992-2000.”).
73
Sexual assault victims’ reasons for not reporting vary. See Statistics About Sexual Violence, Nat’l
Sexual Violence Resource Ctr. (2015), http://www .nsvrc.org/sites/default/files/publications nsvrc
factsheet media-packet statistics-about-sexual-violence 0.pdf (stating that among the reasons why
rape and sexual assault victims do not report to law enforcement are concern for not being believed,
fear of the attackers getting back at him/her, embarrassment or shame. fear of being blamed, pressure
from others not to tell, distrust of law enforcement, belief that there is not enough evidence, and
desire to protect the attacker). Undocumented immigrants in particular tend to under-report crimes out
of fear of adverse immigration consequences. See, e.g., Suzan M. Pritchett, Shielding the Deportable
Outsider: Exploring the Rape Shield Law as Model Evidentiary Rule for Protecting U Visa
Applicants as Witnesses in Criminal Proceedings, 40 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 365, 366 (2017).
74
At least at one time, the reverse situation was more typical: A victim who would be willing to
testify will be persuaded by the police or prosecutor that charges should not be brought because a
conviction is unlikely. See Lisa Frohmann, Constituting Power in Sexual Assault Cases, 45 SOCIAL
PROBLEMS 393 (1998); see also Wayne A. Kerstetter, Gateway to Justice: Police and Prosecutorial
Response to Sexual Assaults Against Women, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMIN. 267, 285 (1990) (finding that
sexual assault complainants will be more willing to prosecute when the accused is in custody and
there is corroboration).
75
Cf. Ric Simmons, Private Plea Bargains, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1125 (2011) (describing and analyzing
private resolutions between crime victims and offenders).
76
Prosecutors do not “represent” victims as clients, but represent “the state” or “the people”;
consequently, prosecutors have no obligation to credit victims, to seek to serve victims’ interests as
distinct from prosecutors’ perception of broader public interests, or to take direction from victims or
seek to achieve their objectives. See generally Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Rape Victims and Prosecutors: The
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It is not uncommon for prosecutors to strongly encourage victims to press forward with criminal
charges when victims regret having set the process in motion. Prosecutors are operating in good faith:
they have put time and effort into the case, believe they can prove it, and believe that justice and public
safety will best be served by a conviction and prison sentence. But victims in a situation like this one
may in fact have any number of reasons for wanting to call a halt to the prosecution. The victim may:
have sympathy for the offender and not want to ruin the offender’s life; want to preserve a relationship
with the offender; or want to defer to friends or family members who are discouraging a prosecution.77
In this case, however, the victim had two other reasons.
First, the victim did not want retribution but something else. Punishing the offender would
bring no comfort, it would make matters worse, including exacerbating her guilt about her own
choices leading up to the offense. The victim felt some responsibility despite being told that only the
offender was to blame. 78 To aid in the psychological healing process, the victim wanted an
Inevitable Ethical Conflict of De Factor Client/Attorney Relationships, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 695
(2007). An empirical study more than two decades ago described that, even before meeting putative
victims of sexual assault, prosecutors made initial judgments about whether to bring a prosecution
based on the likelihood of securing a conviction, following a review of the investigative file and
investigators’ advice; based on their initial assessments, when they first met with victims, prosecutors
either elicited information for potential use in a prosecution or sought to persuade the victim that a
prosecution should not be brought because a conviction would be too difficult to obtain. Lisa
Frohmann, Constituting Power in Sexual Assault Cases, 45 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 393 (1998). A
contemporaneous study suggested that prosecutors’ judgments about the likelihood of a conviction
were based on anticipated juror reactions to the evidence and therefore reinforced juror biases based
on race, class and gender. Lisa Frohmann, Convictability and Discordant Locales: Reproducing
Race, Class, and Gender Ideologies in Prosecutorial Decisionmaking, 31 LAW & SOC. REV. 531
(1997); see also Elizabeth Anne Stanko, The Impact of Victim Assessment on Prosecutors’ Screening
Decisions: The Case of the New York County District Attorney’s Office, 16 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 225,
237 (1981-1982) (concluding that prosecutors’ implicit use of “[s]ocial class, sex, race, and life style”
as factors in making charging decisions often reflects the “pragmatism of a prosecutor intent on
maximizing convictions and using organizational resources efficiently”).
77
Donna Coker, Crime Logic, Campus Sexual Assault, and Restorative Justice, 49 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 147, 195 & nn. 25–26 (2016) (citing the findings of scholars that some victims “don’t want to
ruin a person’s life” but rather want their harm to be validated and to “have choice and input into the
resolution of their violation”); Elizabeth Joh, Narrating Pain: The Problem with Victim Impact
Statements, 10 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 17, 28 (2000) (discussing the failure of the victims’ rights
movement to accept “narratives in which victims’ families can exercise mercy, kindness, or
forgiveness toward defendants”).
78
Audrey K. Miller et. al., Deconstructing Self-Blame Following Sexual Assault: The Critical Roles of
Cognitive Content and Process, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1120, 1122 (2010); (providing
reasons victims blame themselves, which include a perceived inability to say no, drinking to excess,
and consenting to sexual contact prior to the unwanted sexual contact); Donna Coker, Crime Logic,
Campus Sexual Assault, and Restorative Justice, 49 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 147, 194–195 (2016)
(describing the power of restorative justice to help victims “overcome feelings of shame—shame
from conduct that made them uniquely vulnerable”).
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explanation from the offender, an acknowledgment of wrongdoing, an apology, and efforts to make
amends.79 A prosecution put an end to those options. The offender got a lawyer who made it clear to
the victim that she could not speak to his client under any circumstances. The victim, meanwhile,
might have been given a trained rape advocate to support her through the criminal process but had no
means to retain lawyer to offer legal advice or help her extricate herself.
Further, the victim desperately did not want to testify, believing that being compelled to do so
would compound the misery experienced so far. She did not want to relive painful or embarrassing
experience publicly. She did not want to offer an account only to have it poked, prodded and distorted
in court by the prosecutor and defense lawyer. She feared she would be blamed—her intoxication and
her prior relationship, however distant, with the accused used to show that she consented, led him on,
or otherwise failed to behave responsibility and appropriately. She was not ready to go public. She
didn’t want someone else deciding where and how her story would be told—and certainly not in court,
in response to lawyers’ questions, piecemeal, confined by rules of evidence, punctuated by objections.
The victim wanted an empathetic audience, friends and family predisposed to believe and sympathize,
not a dozen strangers on a jury whom a judge instructed to presume that the offender was innocent
and so who were obligated to listen skeptically to her account. She reasonably feared that it will be
painful to be subject to questioning by a defense lawyer, a skilled advocate whose profession and
professional loyalties require trying to make witnesses appear to be mistaken, confused or even
deliberate liars. She anticipated that testifying will be a psychological agony that will set back a long
healing process that is barely underway. The victim wanted no part of the trial and the public ordeal it
entailed.
This prosecutor, however, believed that the offender should be prosecuted regardless of what
the victim wanted. 80 The prosecutor’s view was that, when a case of this type was winnable, it was
important to bring the case to court, both to punish and incapacitate the offender and to deter others.
The prosecutor was sympathetic to this victim, but felt compelled to speak for all victims, aiming to
vindicate a collective victim interest. The prosecutor has a number of reasons for thinking that what
this victim wanted was not what was best for her or for victims generally. 81 For example, the
79

Kathleen Daly, Restorative Justice and Sexual Assault: An Archival Study of Court and Conference
Cases, 46 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 334, 334–56 (2006).
80
Although prosecutors may take account of victims’ preferences among other considerations,
prosecutors ordinarily do not privilege the preferences of crime victims and are not expected to do so.
See Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Discretion: The Difficulty and Necessity of Public Inquiry, 123
DICK. L. REV. 590, 612 (2019).
81
The literature on the prosecution of domestic violence addresses prosecution policies regarding
reluctant victim-witnesses. Some prosecutors will forego criminal charges or seek to prove them
without the victim’s testimony, but others will insist on the victim testifying, and some will even use
the threat of imprisonment to compel reluctant victims to testify. See Deborah Epstein, Transforming
Aggressive Prosecution Policies: Prioritizing Victims’ Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of
Domestic Violence Cases, 11 AM. J. GENDER, SOC. POLC’Y & LAW 465 (2003); Cheryl Hanna, No
Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1849 (1996); Thomas L. Kirsch, II, Problems in Domestic Violence: Should Victims Be Forced
to Participate in the Prosecution of Their Abusers?, 7 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 383 (2001).
Linda G. Mills, Intuition and Insight: A New Job Description for the Battered Woman’s Prosecutor
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prosecutor believed that: deferring to vulnerable victims’ preferences would encourage offenders and
their cohorts to pressure victims not to testify to or withdraw their accusations; it was important to
take a hard line with regard to certain crimes to redress law enforcement authorities’ historic
indifference; unsophisticated crime victims—particularly young people—were not well positioned to
act in their own best interest, especially their long-term best interest, because they had incomplete or
stereotypical understandings of the criminal process. Perhaps the prosecutor was sensitive to the
history of rape prosecutions in which the state’s discretionary decisions have been made disparately
based on irrelevant and impermissible considerations—for example, statistics showing that sexual
assaults committed against women of color are less likely to be prosecuted than sexual assaults
committed against white women. 82
If the case were not winnable at trial, the prosecutor might have dropped the charges or
bargained them down to virtually nothing, even if the victim insisted on prosecuting to the hilt. 83 But
the opposite was true here. The prosecutor not only personally believed the victim but was hopeful
that a jury would find her credible. Without the victim’s testimony, however, there was no case. The
constitutional right of confrontation and evidentiary rules on the inadmissibility of hearsay precluded
the prosecutor from relying instead on the victim’s out-of-court statements to the police and others.84
Only by credibly threatening to take the case to trial could the prosecutor secure a guilty plea as part
of a fair plea bargain.
The victim left school and relocated, partly because the public nature of the case had brought
and Other More Modest Proposals, 7 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 183 (1997); Meg Obenauf, The Isolation
Abyss: A Case Against Mandatory Prosecution, 9 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 263 (1999). See generally
Frank W. Miller, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME 173 (1970) (“An
important factor considered by prosecutors in making day-to-day decisions whether to charge is the
expressed desire of the victim of the crime.”). Prosecutors’ greater willingness to prosecute,
notwithstanding the victim’s reluctance, in domestic violence cases as compared with sexual assault
cases, see note 67, supra, likely reflects the greater ease of securing a conviction in a domestic
violence case without the victim’s testimony or with the testimony of a hostile victim-witness.
82
Donna Coker, Crime Logic, Campus Sexual Assault, and Restorative Justice, 49 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 147, 155 (2016) (“A recent national survey of service providers and advocates found
widespread police dismissiveness and hostility toward intimate partner violence and sexual assault
claims made by sex workers, drug-involved women, poor women (particularly poor women of color),
undocumented women, African American women, and LGBTQ individuals.”).
83
See note __, supra; see also Tamara Rice Lave, The Prosecutor’s Duty to “Imperfect” Rape
Victims, 49 TEX. TECH L. REV. 219 (2016) (criticizing prosecutors’ reluctance to bring cases
involving victims who they think juries will not find credible); Jeffrey W. Spears & Cassia C. Spohn,
The Genuine Victim and Prosecutors’ Charging Decisions in Sexual Assault Cases, 20 AM. J. CRIM.
JUSTICE 183 (1996) (finding that Detroit prosecutors’ charging decisions in sexual assault cases were
influenced by victim characteristics, including conformity with traditional gender role expectations
and prompt reporting, associated with “genuine” victims).
84
See generally Tom Lininger, Prosecution Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747 (2005)
(discussing Confrontation Clause decision impeding the admissibility of victims’ extrajudicial
statements); Anoosha Rouhanian, A Call for Change: The Detrimental Impacts of Crawford v.
Washington on Domestic Violence and Rape Cases, 37 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 1 (2017) (same).
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with it unwelcome attention that made it impossible to resume her regular life, and in part to make it
harder for the prosecutor to find her and bring her to court as a witness. But the prosecutor had an
investigator find her and subpoena her to testify in court. 85 The prosecutor threatened that if the
victim ignored the subpoena, she would be arrested and sent to jail as a “material witness” until the
trial, even while the offender was out on bail. 86 The prosecutor also warned the victim that she would
be jailed for civil contempt of court if she disobeyed the judge’s order to testify, and she could then be
prosecuted, convicted and imprisoned for criminal contempt of court. 87
The accused rejected a plea offer and went to trial, where the victim very reluctantly testified.
The defense lawyer cross-examined her skillfully. Although the rape-shield law barred gratuitous
questioning about her sexual history, and, after procedural skirmishing, the court barred the defense
lawyer from reading her therapist’s notes and those of a victim’s advocate with whom she spoke in
the prosecutor’s office, the rest of her life was an open book. The defense lawyer questioned the
victim in detail about her allegations, including probing everything she said and did about it
afterwards, as well as about anything she did before or since that might be used to make her appear
unworthy of being believed. Contrary to the prosecutor’s hopes, the jury acquitted the defendant. 88
Meanwhile, the community in which the victim and the offender both live was roiled by the
case. The victim was exposed to angry outbursts from those who believed that she was ruining a
promising young man’s life. Having been scarred by the cross-examination, the victim viewed the
verdict as a rejection. She sunk deeper into depression. 89
Over the course of this process, the victim was told more than once about the state law that
85

Even victim-witnesses who leave the jurisdiction may be brought back to testify. See, e.g., People
v. Cogswell, 227 P.3d 409 (Cal. 2010) (finding that prosecutor may compel out-of-state victimwitness’s appearance through the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from without
the State in Criminal Cases).
86
Emily Shugarman, Rape Survivors Face Jail If They Won’t Testify in Louisiana, Independent, April
21, 2017, (quoting Orleans Parish District Attorney Leon Cannizzaro saying, “If I have to put a victim
of a crime in jail, for eight days, in order to . . keep the rapist off of the street, for a period of years
and to prevent him from raping or harming someone else, I'm going to do that.”).
Cf. Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313 (3d Cir. 2011) (civil action for alleged unconstitutional
detention of a material witness).
87
Cf. In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 195 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 2016) (sanctioning judge who held
victim in contempt of court for violating trial subpoena).
88
The conviction rate for criminal prosecutions in general is high in many jurisdictions. But the
conviction rate for certain offenses, such as assault, is lower than for other offenses. See BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, FAQ DETAIL (reporting that among felony defendants, over a one-year period,
the conviction rate was lowest for defendants charged with assault (45%)),
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=qa&iid=403.
89
Criminal trials do not invariably re-traumatize crime victims. See Ulrich Orth & Andreas
Maercker, Do Trials of Perpetrators Retraumatize Crime Victims?, 19 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE
212 (2004). But victims who are dissatisfied with the outcome of the criminal trial are more likely to
experience psychological harm. See Uli Orth, Secondary Victimization of Crime Victims by Criminal
Proceedings, 15 SOCIAL JUST. RES. 313 (2002).
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codifies a crime victims’ rights.90 The victim had the opportunity to confer with the prosecutor, 91 but
the prosecutor was uninterested in what she had to say after she expressed her desire not to move
forward with a criminal case. The victim had the right to watch the entire trial, but she could think of
nothing worse. The state had a lawyer and the accused had a lawyer, but she was never assigned a
lawyer to advise her, to try to persuade the prosecutor to spare her the agony of testifying, and to help
her assert whatever rights she had. 92
If the offender had been found guilty, the victim might have been able to tell the judge her
story in a less circumscribed fashion – though not necessarily entirely in her own way. 93 But she
never got that chance, and in any event, she was more interested in speaking privately with a therapist
than publicly with a judge. After her long ordeal, she did finally get one thing she wanted all along
from the criminal process—to be left alone. But the offense remained a living memory as did the
painful criminal process that followed it from the day she reported the offense until the offender’s
acquittal.
B. The Under-Emphasized Harms to Victims
As the composite narrative in Section A reflects, five fundamental harms to victims were
overlooked or downplayed in the 1982 Task Force report. They were not addressed in the Task Force
recommendations or in the laws pursued by victims’ rights advocates in the succeeding decades.
These harms are not caused by the offender, except perhaps indirectly by setting the criminal process
in motion. They are caused by the criminal adjudicative process itself and by its participants in their
quest for punishment. Though underemphasized by proponents of a victims’ rights amendment and
90

Victims’ rights laws generally require prosecutors or other law enforcement authorities to advise
victims of their rights. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-37-3(3)(d) (requiring the law enforcement
agency investigating a sexual offense to victims of their statutory rights).
91
See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 239 F. Supp. 3d 417 (D. Conn. 2017) (rejecting plea agreement
where prosecutor failed to provide victim’s mother an opportunity to confer in advance as required
by the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(1)(5) (2012)).
92
Victims’ rights laws do not generally provide for the appointment of counsel to victims. See
generally Margaret Garvin & Douglas E. Beloof, Crime Victim Agency: Independent Lawyers for
Sexual Assault Victims, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 67 (2015); Myka Held, Note, A Constitutional
Remedy for Sexual Assault Survivors, 16 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 445 (2015); Erin J. Heuring, Til It
Happens to You: Providing Victims of Sexual Assault with Their Own Legal Representation, 53
IDAHO L. REV. 689 (2017); Tyrone Kirchengast, Victim Lawyers, Victim Advocates, and the
Adversarial Criminal Trial, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 568 (2013). Further, the laws generally limit the
extent to which victims’ privately retained lawyers can intervene in criminal proceedings to assert
victims’ rights and protect their interests. See generally Douglas Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime
Victims' Rights: Standing, Remedy and Review, 2005 BYU L. REV. 255 (2005). That role is
principally assigned to the prosecutor, notwithstanding the universal understanding that the
prosecutor does not represent the victim as a client. See generally Stacy Caplow, What If There Is No
Client?: Prosecutors as “Counselors” of Crime Victims, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 1 (1998); Pokorak,
supra note 67.
93
See, e.g., Graham v. State, 440 P.3d 309 (Alaska 2019) (sentencing judge improperly allowed
victims’ families to play memorial videos that appealed to judge’s emotions).
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similar reforms, these harms have garnered significant attention from those who seek to reform the
criminal process in more fundamental ways, including by expanding the pursuit of restorative justice. 94
First, the criminal process denies the victim an opportunity to pursue a form of justice –
restorative justice – that may be more important to her than the retributive justice achieved by
traditional criminal adjudications. The criminal process holds out the promise of a conviction and
prison sentence for the offender. But the victim’s psychological well-being may be better served in a
restorative justice process, if the offender is equally willing to undertake it. In a restorative justice
process, supportive community members participate, the victim can tell her story her way, and the
offender acknowledges and apologizes for the harm he caused, shows insight into his behavior,
accepts responsibility, and takes affirmative steps to repair the harm and not to harm others. 95
Restorative justice may be employed at various stages of a criminal process, 96 but our focus is on its
use as an alternative to a criminal adjudication and incarceration – that is, on the diversion of
offenders to a restorative justice process just as defendants in drug cases are diverted to drug courts
where they agree to drug treatment instead of a prosecution and potential incarceration. As an
alternative to criminal prosecution and punishment, restorative justice is premised on the belief that
prison is a blunt and ineffective instrument ill-suited to achieving its aims. The criminal process
encourages the offender to deny or minimize responsibility thus thwarting the needs of some victims
for accountability and repair. 97

94

See, e.g., Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg & Tali Gal, Restorative Criminal Justice, 34 CARDOZO L. REV.
2313 (2013); Jean Ferguson, Professional Discretion and the Use of Restorative Justice Programs in
Appropriate Domestic Violence Cases: An Effective Innovation, 4 CRIM. L. BRIEF 3 (2009); Zvi D.
Gabbay, Justifying Restorative Justice: A Theoretical Justification for the Use of Restorative Justice
Practices, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 349 (2005); Mary Ellen Reimund, The Law and Restorative Justice:
Friend or Foe? A Systemic Look at the Legal Issues in Restorative Justice, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 667
(2005); Sered, supra note 10; Heather Strang & Lawrence W. Sherman, Repairing the Harm: Victims
and Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 15, 20–21.
95
See Sered, supra note 10, at 96 et seq.
96
In some jurisdictions, for example, restorative justice follows a defendant’s guilty plea and its
outcome is factored into the judge’s sentencing decision. A program established in 2015 by U.S.
District Court Judge Leo Sorokin in federal district court in Boston requires defendants facing serious
though non-violent felony charges to plead guilty before entering into an 18-month long program that
includes drug treatment, if necessary, enrollment in school or obtaining or maintaining a job, and
participation in a court-run restorative justice program. Most of the defendants who enroll in this
program are facing at least several years in prison. Those who successfully complete the program are
usually sentenced to probation. Lara Bazelon, “Redemption for Offenders and Victims,” American
Prospect, Jan. 18, 2018. The program does not accept defendants accused of sexual assault offenses,
however.
97
While victims might theoretically pursue restorative justice after criminal proceedings are
concluded, the opportunity may be entirely unavailable at that point. The offender, if convicted at
trial, may appeal and will not want to compromise that appeal by making admissions. If the offender
is not convicted, he or she will likely want nothing further to do with the case. Even if restorative
justice is available post-trial, the victim may suffer further from the delay and the additional trauma
that proceeded it.
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Second, the criminal process denies the crime victim agency or autonomy: after suffering a
criminal offense that left her feeling disempowered, the victim loses control over how the offense will
be addressed. 98 The victim cannot require the prosecutor to “drop the charges” or refuse to testify if
the prosecution goes forward. Defense counsel may call the victim as a witness if the prosecutor does
not do so. 99 As long as there is sufficient evidence to justify a prosecution, the decision whether to
bring charges and whether to compel the victim to testify is up to the prosecutor.
It was not always this way. In the early days of the Republic, as a carryover from the English
tradition, private prosecutions gave victims more influence over the prosecuting decision. 100 But by
the twentieth century, that largely changed. 101 Prosecuting is now in the hands of public prosecutors.
Theoretically, and as a matter of discretion, and evidence permitting, prosecutors could defer to crime
victims regarding whether to bring charges, offer a plea bargain, or call the victim as a witness. 102 But
while some victims’ rights laws require prosecutors to confer with victims about these decisions,
none require prosecutors to defer to victims. 103 Prosecutors do not represent the victim per se, they
represent the interests of “the People,” “the Commonwealth” or “the Government” and are expected
to act in the best interests of that larger group even if it conflicts with the interest of an individual
victim. 104
Third, victims have no control, in particular, over how they or the lawyers at trial tell their
story.
Constitutional, statutory and evidentiary provisions provide a framework governing how
victims’ stories can be told. Prosecutors, through direct examination, and defense lawyers, through
cross-examination, elicit the information they require. Through their opening and closing statements,
these lawyers then give meaning to the testimony, characterize it, credit or discredit it, digest it and
explain it to the jury. Victims’ stories do not belong to them in the criminal process. Once the
prosecutor decides to call a victim as a witness, the victim’s story is shaped and appropriated by
others.
105

98

For academic writings on victims’ loss of agency, see, e.g., Garvin & Beloof, supra note 83, at 69–
72; Kirchengast, supra note 83.
99
See, e.g., A.H. v. Superior Court of Arizona, 911 P.2d 633 (Ariz. App. 1996).
100
See Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Enforcement Redundancy: Oversight of Decisions Not to
Prosecute, 103 MINN. L. REV. 844 (2018); Michael Edmund O'Neill, Private Vengeance and the
Public Good, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 659 (2010).
101
Bennett Capers, Against Prosecutors, __ Cornell L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming 2019)
102
Id.
103
See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 239 F. Supp. 3d 417 (D. Conn. 2017) (rejecting plea agreement
where federal prosecutor failed to give the victim’s family an opportunity to confer with the
prosecutor in advance, as required by the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 18. U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5)).
104
Lara A. Bazelon, Hard Lessons: The Role of Law Schools in Addressing Prosecutorial
Misconduct, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 391, 410 (2011) (“Unlike a defense attorney, whose sole object
is to advance the interests of her client, prosecutors have no living, breathing individual for whom to
advocate. Contrary to popular belief, the prosecutor does not represent the crime victim, at least not
any more directly than she represents her next-door neighbor. The prosecutor's client is an
impersonal monolith: the state, county, or federal government.”).
105
See, e.g., Nils Christie, Conflicts as Property, 17 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. 1 (1977).
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Fourth, victims have no right to protection from self-harm. The compulsion that they testify,
subject to civil and criminal contempt, means that they can be forced to hurt themselves
psychologically by submitting to public interrogation. Criminal defendants have a right against selfharm in the form of self-incriminatory testimony; they can refuse to testify in the adjudicative
process. 106 Crime victims have no equivalent right. No matter how much they may be hurt
psychologically by having to testify, the decision is not theirs. It is, principally, that of the
prosecutor.
Fifth, victims’ privacy is subject to intrusion by both the prosecution and defense. Rape shield
laws are not an absolute barrier to the inspection and exposure of deeply private information. 107 Even
victims’ medical and mental health records may be subject to discovery and introduced into evidence
at trial, notwithstanding the ordinary expectation that communications with health-care professionals
are confidential. 108 State laws do not necessarily recognize an absolute privilege for communications
with a therapist or other medical professional, and health-care records may therefore be subject to
discovery, particularly if they are likely to assist in the defense. 109
Finally, victims are on their own. Most cannot afford to retain counsel, and are not afforded a
lawyer to advise them, to advocate on their behalf with the prosecutor, and to help them take
advantage of whatever legal protections may be available. 110 It is axiomatic that individuals with
legal rights need lawyers to help implement those rights. Individuals embroiled in the criminal justice
process, if only as witnesses, benefit from legal advice; consequently, corporations commonly
compensate lawyers to represent officers and employees who are witnesses in both civil and criminal
cases involving the corporation. 111 But the Victims’ Rights Amendments that are periodically reintroduced in Congress do not include a right to counsel for crime victims. The victims’ movement
106

U.S. Const. amend. V; see, e.g., Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (reversing defendant’s
conviction where prosecutor impeached his exculpatory story with his failure to give that story postarrest and after invoking his right to silence); United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 182–83 (1975)
(White, J., concurring) (holding that a prosecutor may not hold a defendant’s post-Miranda
invocation of silence against him at trial).
107
Alison Menkes, Rape and Sexual Assault, 7 GEO. J. OF GENDER AND THE LAW 847, 849–50 (2006)
(noting the ineffectiveness of rape shield laws to protect against disclosure of a victim’s “sexual and
psychological history”).
108
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Admitting Mental Health Evidence to Impeach the Credibility of a Sexual
Assault Victim, 153 U. PENN. L. REV. 1373 (2005) (noting that defendants may request “a review of
the complainant’s mental health history, a mental health examination, or cross examination as to a
history of psychological problems”); Jeffrey Toobin, The Consent Defense, NEW YORKER (Sept. 1,
2003) (discussing Colorado’s rape shield laws in connection with the defense of consent raised by
Kobe Bryant’s lawyers after he was accused of rape).
109
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d 400 (Mass. 2006); see also Meagen K. Monahan,
Note, Why Dwyer Got It Wrong: A Call to Rebalance the Scale and Protect Absolute Privileged
Communications Between Sexual Assault Victims and Counselors, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1523 (2016).
110
See note __, supra.
111
See NY City Bar, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 2019-4 (2019) (addressing ethical implications of
corporation’s payment of a single “pool counsel” to represent multiple officers or employees as
witnesses in an investigation).
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has not made a right to counsel into a priority.
C. The Limitations of Victims’ Rights Law
The victims’ rights movement called attention to victims’ interests, called out the historically
gendered and even misogynistic nature of sex crimes prosecutions, and obtained significant social and
legal reforms for all victims and sex crimes victims in particular. 112 These are important
achievements. But, as the prior sections suggest, there are significant limitations to criminal procedure
reforms that have been enacted so far, and to the federal constitutional Victims’ Rights Amendment
that might one day become the movement’s crowning achievement. 113
The criminal procedural reforms initiated by victims’ rights advocates take our criminal
adjudicative process as both a given and a point of departure. The goal was never to offer an
alternative but to improve the criminal process for crime victims’ benefit. One underlying assumption
of the reform effort, as we have noted, was that the preferred resolution, from all victims’ perspective,
was a criminal conviction and a severe, retributive sentence.114 For many advocates, another
assumption was that, regardless of the outcome, the criminal process might well be inevitable if
victims went to the police, and so the best that could be done for crime victims was to try to limit how
much the process harmed them. 115
As we discuss in Part III, both assumptions are challenged by some victims and by proponents
of restorative justice processes, who argue that these restorative processes achieve better outcomes for
many victims while helping them heal, rather than re-victimizing them. 116 Among other things,
restorative justice processes aim to avert the above-discussed harms that are intrinsic to adversarial
adjudication. This is not to say that restorative justice is suitable or preferable in all cases. On the
112

Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 Yale L.J. 1087 (1986) (describing a history of rape law prosecutions in
which, when it was not a violent stranger rape, “the woman must bear any guilt, the law has reflected,
legitimized and reinforced a view of sex and woman which celebrates male aggressiveness and
punishes female passivity”); Rebekah Smith, Protecting the Victim: Rape and Sexual Harassment
Shields Under Maine and Federal Law, 49 ME. L. REV. 443, 455-59 (1997) (documenting “changes
in both substantive and evidentiary rules of rape law”).
113
See note __, supra (citing academic literature on proposed Victims’ Rights Amendments).
114
Research has not borne out this assumption. Heather Strang & Lawrence W. Sherman, Repairing
the Harm: Victims and Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 15, 18 & n.11 (“Most victims are in
fact quite ‘lenient’ in their own views about sentencing. Large proportions of crime victims surveyed
are willing to consider alternatives to imprisonment for their offenders if they can play a part in the
way their case is handled.”) (citing Lucia Zedner, Victims in The Oxford Handbook of Criminology,
419, 443–44 (Mike Maguire et. al. eds. 2002)).
115
Cf. Christa Obold-Eshleman, Note, Victims’ Rights and the Danger of Domestication of the
Restorative Justice Paradigm, 18 ND J.L. ETHICS & PUB POL’Y 571, 594 (2004) (observing that “the
current victims’ rights laws and proposals are developing largely in a way that is problematic for the
restorative justice vision”).
116
Heather Strang & Lawrence W. Sherman, Repairing the Harm: Victims and Restorative Justice,
2003 UTAH L. REV. 15, 15, 22 (2003) (citing studies showing that “evidence for the success in
repairing the harm of crime is rapidly accumulating”).
26
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3493956

contrary, victims’ situations vary. Sometimes, victims will prefer a criminal prosecution to go forward
and will benefit from its success; sometimes, the public interest in a criminal prosecution should
outweigh the victim’s interest in an alternative; and sometimes, restorative justice is not a viable
alternative because of the character of the offender. There are victims who want aid, social services,
and restitution without participating in a criminal adjudicatory process. There are also victims who
want no part of any process at all – restorative or adjudicatory. But proponents argue that restorative
justice is often preferable for at least some victims: not only in cases of less serious crimes or juvenile
offenders, where it is more likely to be employed (though still under-utilized) in the United States, but
also in cases of violent crimes (including sexual assaults), which have conventionally been considered
the most serious and therefore the most deserving of a retributive public response. 117
The victims’ rights movement’s focus on criminal adjudication and retributivism owes much
not only to its history but also to politics. 118 Efforts to reform the criminal process for victims’ benefit
needs the support of multiple branches of government. Its success depends on legislative funding for
social programs and, with respect to reforming the criminal process in particular, on legislative support
except in the few jurisdictions, such as California, where public referendums are an alternative.
Further, the movement has sought changes in prosecutorial and judicial practices. It calls for victimcentered judicial interpretations and applications of constitutional and statutory provisions. These
reforms require sympathetic prosecutors and judges. But from the start, public officials saw an
opportunity to coopt the victims’ rights movement in aid of a broader conservative agenda. An
example was the Presidential Task Force’s proposal to reform the Fourth Amendment. 119 The
suppression of evidence in criminal cases was not a problem that related particularly to crimes with
victims, but anything that made it easier to secure criminal convictions could potentially be
characterized as a victim-centered reform.
For at least two reasons, the movement’s success has depended, in particular, on securing the
support of prosecutors. First, when it comes to the development of criminal law, prosecutors have
enormous influence with legislators and judges. Legislators view prosecutors as particularly
knowledgeable and experienced, and as representatives of the public interest. Second, proponents of
victims’ rights laws have had to walk a tightrope: their argument for more process turns in part on
implication that prosecutors have ill-served victims. Indeed, the campaign for a Victims’ Rights
Amendment was founded on the idea that prosecutors have failed to afford victims the protections
guaranteed by statutes. At the same time, however, victims’ rights advocates also have to make the
case that their interests and the prosecutors’ interests were aligned. That is, victims’ rights advocates
have also had to convince prosecutors that their proposed reforms were consistent with prosecutors’
objectives and would not excessively burden them. 120 To maintain the symbiotic relationship, victims’
117

See, e.g., Sered, UNTIL WE RECKON supra note 10, passim.
Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, supra note 12, at 771–74 (2007) (stating that the victims’
rights movement was coopted by the tough on crime movement, neither of which had any “tolerance
for victims’ desires that conflict with state prosecutorial goals”).
119
President’s Task Force Report, supra note 25, at 17, 24–28.
120
This was no easy task and has not been entirely successful. An obligation to provide information to
victims throughout the process is time-consuming and takes resources away from work that
prosecutors may regard as more important. And while giving victims a voice with regard to plea
bargaining or sentencing may support prosecutors’ efforts, victims may also interfere with what the
118
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rights advocates were compelled to embrace retributivism. Prosecutors, in turn, relied on the victims’
rights movement to bolster their claim that locking up offenders was the best way to serve the most
vulnerable and deserving people.
Prosecutors could generally accommodate contemporary victims’ rights laws, which work
within the basic structure of the criminal adjudicatory process. Even prosecutors who viewed these
laws as burdensome knew that it is politically perilous to be seen as opposing them. Thus, the implicit
bargain between victims’ rights proponents and prosecutors was struck in the 1980’s. Victims’ rights
advocates secured prosecutors’ support for victims’ rights laws that, in turn, preserved prosecutors’
power by reaffirming the criminal adjudicative process within which they operated. 121
Perhaps that was the best deal that victims’ rights advocates could obtain in the 1980’s and
ensuing years. But the result is that, largely for reasons of political expediency, the contemporary
victims’ rights movement focuses its efforts on victims’ rights laws, such as Marsy’s Law, that would
do nothing to address some of the most fundamental and serious harms inflicted on crime victims by
the criminal adjudicative process. 122
III. The Myth of the Monolithic Victim and the Failure of the Carceral Solution
Any process built on the assumption that victims are a monolithic group who all want and need to
see the offender convicted and harshly punished is deeply flawed. 123 But advocates for victims’
rights reform have historically operated from this premise. 124 To be sure, since the 1970s and
continuing through the present, victims’ advocates have rightly pointed out that the existing system of
rape prosecutions was cumbersome, unfair, and misogynistic. 125 They successfully sought changes to
prosecutor considers to be in the best interest of the public overall. Michael Lyle, “Marsy’s Law:
Sounds Good, But Is It?” NEVADA CURRENT (Aug. 31, 2018) (quoting the executive director of the
North Dakota State’s Attorneys Association as critical of the law for its vagueness, the expense of
implementing it, and possibly slowing down the adjudication of cases).
121
AYA GRUBER, THE FEMINIST WAR ON CRIME: THE UNEXPECTED ROLE OF WOMEN’S LIBERATION
IN MASS INCARCERATION PAGE (U.C. Press forthcoming 2020).
122
What would happen if at least some prosecutors became supportive of restorative justice practices
as an alternative to the carceral solution? We expect that conventional prosecutors will perceive
efforts to establish restorative justice processes, in the name of victims’ rights, as an existential threat
for multiple reasons on which we will elaborate in a later article. Suffice it to say that it seems likely
that conventional prosecutors will vehemently oppose reforms that would diminish their power and
discretion by diverting criminal cases to processes, such as restorative justice processes, controlled by
social service agencies and community representatives.
123
See note 12, supra.
124
Markus Dirk Dubber, The Victim in American Penal Law: A Systemic Overview, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 3, 6 (1999-2000) (describing the Victims’ Rights Movement as “fueled by grassroots campaigns
of concerned citizens backed by politicians eager to outgo their opponents in the tough-on-crime
competition”); Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, supra note 12, 774–45 (“As a tool of toughon-crime penological goals, the victim must occupy a specific, predefined legal space, such that
granting her ‘rights’ must necessarily lead to more incarceration for the defendant.”).
125
Ronet Bachman & Raymond Paternoster, A Contemporary Look at the Effects of Rape Law
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that process meant to address those impediments, imbalances, and biases. But reckoning with the
shameful history of rape prosecutions in the United States has led to both an over- and an undercorrection. The answer to every sexual assault victim is not for prosecutors to hold out the same illkept promise—“we will relieve your pain by prosecuting your offender to the maximum possible
extent”—while victims’ rights advocates nod vigorously in agreement. 126
The promise is ill-kept for two reasons. First, as we discuss below, there is scant evidence to
suggest that punishing an offender to the maximum possible extent ameliorates the suffering of
victims. 127 To the contrary: studies show that any satisfaction victims may experience from such an
outcome is temporary and not conducive to the healing process. 128 Second, the conviction rate for
rape and sexual assault remains notoriously low, estimated at approximately 12 percent in 2007, and
less than one percent from 2010-2014. 129 Rape retains the dubious distinction of being “the least
reported, least indicted, and least convicted non-property felony.” 130 For non-white victims, the
Reform: How Far Have We Come?, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 554, 555 (1993); Julie K. Brown,
Justice Department Opens Probe into Jeffrey Epstein Plea Deal, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 6, 2019)
(describing how Jeffrey Epstein, a millionaire financier with connections to former President Clinton
and other powerbrokers, obtained a deal from federal prosecutors in 2008 that allowed him to avoid a
trial and lengthy prison sentence on sex trafficking charges).
126
Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, supra note 12, at 749–50 (describing how the victims’
rights movement became increasingly aligned with prosecutors tough on crime agendas at the
expense of the victims themselves); Sofie Karasek, I’m a Campus Sexual Assault Activist. It’s Time
to Reimagine How We Punish Sex Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2018) (writing that as a survivor of
sexual assault, she believes that “punitive justice,” including prison, “is not designed to provide
validation, acknowledgement or closure” and is not a guarantee that the offender will stop offending).
127
Ulrich Orth, Does Perpetrator Punishment Satisfy Victims’ Feelings of Revenge?, 30 AGGRESSIVE
BEHAVIOR 62, 68 (2004).
128
Susan Bandes, When Victims Seek Closure: Forgiveness, Vengeance and the Role of Government,
27 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1599, 1602-03 (2000) (noting the lack of empirical evidence to support the
premise that victims require severe punishment of offenders to heal); SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON 40
(“[T]ime after time, victims tell the parole board that they still feel exactly the same way they did the
day the crime occurred. Ten, fifteen, twenty years later—they feel the same.”); Interview with
Stepheny Milo, June 28, 2019 (Milo’s son, Matthew Seivert, was senselessly murdered in 2003. She
said that, 16 years later, she feels exactly the same amount of rage and pain) (interview on file with
Lara Bazelon).
129
Andrew Van Dam, Less Than 1% of Rapes Lead to Felony Convictions, WASH. POST (Oct. 6,
2018) https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/10/06/less-than-percent-rapes-lead-felonyconvictions-least-percent-victims-face-emotional-physical-consequences/ (citing an analysis by
RAINN, which in turn relied on data gathered by the DOJ from 2010-2014); MARY KOSS & MARY
ACHILLES, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ASSAULT, NATIONAL ONLINE RESOURCE
CENTER FOR VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 4 (2008),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4dd0/82fbebcf20665eacf2f8e9447678974a09ae.pdf?_ga=2.1114635
56.1440798903.1567804160-1316325837.1545245920 (last accessed Sept. 6, 2019) (reporting a 12%
conviction rate for rape in the United States, according to 2007 data).
130
MARY KOSS & MARY ACHILLES, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ASSAULT,
NATIONAL ONLINE RESOURCE CENTER FOR VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 4 (2008); DAVID KARP ET
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outcomes are grimmer still. Because of implicit and explicit biases, police are less likely to refer their
cases for prosecution, prosecutors are less likely to bring charges, and jurors are less likely to
convict. 131” In short, non-white victims, particularly those who suffer from poverty and substance
abuse and who have criminal records, fare differently and worse at every stage of the criminal justice
system. 132
Women of color, trans women, and women in the LGBTQ community are invisible in the public
narrative about rape, and less likely to have their interests represented in the courtroom. 133 The
stereotypical rape victim is a young innocent white woman violently raped by a black male
AL., CAMPUS PRISM: A REPORT ON PROMOTING RESTORATIVE INITIATIVES FOR SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES 8–9 (2016) (stating that only 13 percent of victims of campus sexual assaults

report them and the lack of reporting “can be exacerbated for students of color and LGBTQ students
who may have low expectations that the institutional process will be responsive to their needs”).
131
Elizabeth Kennedy, Feminist Sexual Ethics Project, Victim Race and Rape: A Review of Recent
Research 18-30, http://www.brandeis.edu/projects/fse/slavery/slav-us/slav-us-articles/slav-us-artkennedy-full.pdf. Mining data in Kansas City and Philadelphia revealed that “prosecutors were 4 ½
times more likely to file charges if the victim was white.” A study of 900 cases in Indianapolis
concluded that “[b]lack men accused of assaulting black women accounted for 45 percent of all
reported rapes but for only 26 percent of all men sentenced to the state penitentiary and for only 17
percent of men who received sentences of six or more years. By contrast, black men accused of
raping white women accounted for 23 percent of all reported rapes, but for 45 percent of all men sent
to the state penitentiary and for 50 percent of all men who received prison sentences of six or more
years.” Id. at 16. Moreover, black women are “significantly less likely” to report having been
sexually assaulted to the police than white women in part because “[t]he credibility of Black women
as rape victims has never been established as firmly as it has been for White women.” Gail Elizabeth
Wyatt, The Sociocultural Context of African American and White Women’s Rape, 48 J, SOC, ISSUES
86 (1992).
132
Mary Koss & Mary Achilles, Restorative Justice Responses to Sexual Assault, National Online
Resource Center for Violence Against Women 4 (2008) (stating that decisions whether to prosecute
are “unduly influenced” by factors that include “class, race, character, conduct, mental health, sexual
history, lack of injury, failure to manifest extreme emotional distress, and absent evidence of strong
resistance”); Elizabeth Kennedy, Feminist Sexual Ethics Project, Victim Race and Rape: A Review of
Recent Research 11, http://www.brandeis.edu/projects/fse/slavery/slav-us/slav-us-articles/slav-us-artkennedy-full.pdf (“The overwhelming majority of studies confirm that the victim’s race plays a
significant role throughout the process of investigating and prosecuting rape crimes: specifically,
these studies suggest that African American women who are victims of rape encounter a legal system
that perceives them and the seriousness of their injuries differently because of their race.”)
133
SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON 204–06 (citing studies and stating that we often fail to tell the stories of
victims who are not white and heterosexual or “[w]hen we do tell them, we do so in a distorted
way”); AYA GRUBER, THE FEMINIST WAR ON CRIME: THE UNEXPECTED ROLE OF WOMEN’S
LIBERATION IN MASS INCARCERATION (U.C. Press forthcoming 2020) (describing the ideal victim
from the perspective of the feminist movement as a middle class innocent white woman and stating
that “[w]omen who fell outside that idea were often not helped, or even harmed, by policies tailored
for [that ideal victim]”); BETH RICHIE, ARRESTED JUSTICE: BLACK WOMEN, VIOLENCE, AND
AMERICA’S PRISON NATION 90 (2012).
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stranger. 134 Yet cross-racial stranger rapes are a fraction of sex crimes overall. 135 No victim could
represent the group as a whole, but this particular kind of essentialism—the victim must be an
innocent white woman brutally raped by a bestial black man—plays on racial and gender stereotypes
and tends to result in an embrace of the carceral solution as necessary, deserved, and effective. 136 In
fact, inter-racial sexual violence is rare; far more common are intra-racial non-stranger sexual
assaults. 137 Victims are a diverse group: sexual violence occurs across race, ethnicity, geographic
area, sexual orientation and socioeconomic class. Men are also victims of rape and sexual assault, 138
and trans women and LGBTQ women are at a particularly high risk. 139 Ignoring these victims in the
public narrative and treating them as second-class victims in the criminal justice system underscores
the need for a different approach. Casting the stereotypical offender as a hyper-sexualized black man
Sharin N. Elkholy, Feminism and Race in the United States, https://www.iep.utm.edu/fem-race/
(last visited Aug. 25, 2019); Lynne Henderson, Co-opting Compassion: The Federal Victim’s Rights
Amendment, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 579, 583–85 (1998).
135
Sered, UNTIL WE RECKON 22–23 (“In this way, when the image of an innocent young white
woman is invoked as the prototypical victim, it not only supplants and displaces the lived experience
of the vast majority of victims who do not belong to that demographic. It is also meant to conjure up
a story about what justice looks like—justice in which the victim is pure and innocent, in which the
person who caused harm is vengeful and monstrous, in which the prosecutor is righteous and
vengeful, and in which the system as we know it contains them all in a rightful and proper order.”);
Aya Gruber, Righting Victim Wrongs: Responding to Philosophical Criticisms of the Nonspecific
Victim Liability Defense, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 433, 433 (2004) (collecting stereotypes of victims); Vik
Kanwar, Capital Punishment as “Closure”: The Limits of a Victim-Centered Jurisprudence, 27 NYU
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215, 231 (2002) (“The public face of the Victims’ Rights Movement hides
the most severely affected victims of violent crime, sexism and racism (e.g., prostitutes or teenage
black males in the juvenile justice system) who are implicitly disqualified as ‘genuine’ victims in
Victims Rights’ rhetoric.”).
136
SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON 194–96 (describing the effects of this archetype: black men are hypersexualized and portrayed as irredeemable monsters while white women are helpless and dependent on
white men for “protection and survival” while black victims’ pain is discounted as “somehow outside
of and irrelevant to the justice equation”).
137
Elizabeth Kennedy, supra note 120, at 10.
138
RAINN, Sexual Assault of Men and Boys, https://www.rainn.org/articles/sexual-assault-men-andboys; Tina Vasquez, #MeToo: Addressing Sexual Assault and Abuse in Social Justice Movements,
REWIRE (November 3, 2017), https://rewire.news/article/2017/11/03/metoo-addressing-sexualassault-abuse-social-justice-movements/ (describing a case in which a self-identified queer man was
raped by another man who was a member of his community).
139
Sexual Assault and the LGBTQ Community, Human Rights Campaign,
https://www.hrc.org/resources/sexual-assault-and-the-lgbt-community (citing 2015 Transgender
Survey and the Centers for Disease Control’s 2010 study on victimization broken down by sexual
orientation); Donna Coker, Crime, Logic, and Campus Sexual Assault, 49 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 147,
162–63 (2016) (citing the DOJ’s 2016 Campus Climate Survey Validation Study as documenting
“significantly higher” rates of sexual assault for LGBTQ women and a 2010 National Intimate
Partner and Sexual Violence study finding that “nearly 34% of multiracial non-Hispanic women and
approximately 27% of indigenous women experienced rape in their lifetime compared to 18.8% of
non-Hispanic women and 14.6% of Hispanic women”).
134
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preying on a white woman is not only false, it promulgates centuries-old pernicious racial
stereotyping. 140
The narrative set forth at length in the 1982 Task Force report described a victim of violence at a
stranger’s hands who presumably would be restored to well-being through the expeditious arrest,
incapacitation, conviction and punishment of the offender. But this paradigm of the crime victim, and
underlying assumption that the criminal process can be better calibrated to meet her needs, are
flawed. Many crime victims simply do not fit this paradigm or any other, as sexual assault cases
illustrate. Seventy-eight percent of sexual assaults involve victims and offenders who know each
other. Often, they come from the same communities. 141 More than a third of these cases involve
intimate partner violence. Some of the offenders were victims of sexual violence themselves. 142 Poor
women, both white and non-white, are far more likely to be assaulted than middle or upper class
women. 143 Many victims, particularly from communities disproportionately impacted by mass
incarceration, do not want to be part of a criminal process that they view as destructive because it
ravages their neighborhoods and breaks apart their families, and because they feel unsafe knowing
that the offender will come back to their community unrehabilitated and hardened by prison. 144 Other
victims may be unwilling to go forward with a criminal prosecution because they move in the same
social or professional circles as the offender or because they believe that the offender would benefit
N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial Black
Male, supra note 42, at 1322–32.
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141

Michael Planty et. al., Bureau of Justice Statistics, Female Victims of Sexual Violence 1994-2010
at 4 (special report issued 2013 and revised 2016). “The NCVS collects information on nonfatal
crimes reported and not reported to the police from a nationally representative sample of persons age
12 or older who live in U.S. households.” Id. at 2.

142

Linda G. Mills, The Justice of Recovery: How the State Can Heal Victims of Crime, 57 HASTINGS
L.J. 457, 481–82 (2006) (“Intimate abuse cases are a classic example of victim turned victimizer,
insofar as men who experienced and observed violence in their families of origin were five to nine
times more likely to become violent against their partners.”).
143
Michael Planty et. al., Bureau of Justice Statistics, Female Victims of Sexual Violence 1994-2010
at 4 (special report issued 2013 and revised 2016) (noting that “females in households earning less
than$25,000 per year experienced 3.5 rape or sexual assault victimizations per 1,000 females
compared to 1.9 per 1,000 in households earning between $25,000 and $49,999, and 1.8 per 1,000 in
households earning $50,000 or more”); SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON 216–18 (describing poor white
and working class white neighborhoods as “beset by violence” that includes sexual violence that
devastates families and communities).
144
SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON, 29, 35–36,185–86 (citing examples to explain why for some sexual
assault victims “engagement of law enforcement is regarded as likely to increase rather than diminish
the threat of their safety and the safety of their families); Lynne Henderson, Co-opting Compassion:
The Federal Victim’s Rights Amendment, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 579, 600 (1998) (“The punitive
history of oppression, lynching, and harsh treatment by a white-dominated legal system and the
damage that system has done to African American communities in this country is neither distant nor
unreal. To concentrate on revenge and punishment may isolate the victim and create a cruel dilemma
for her by demanding that she choose between her rage and her community.”).
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from treatment or other rehabilitative programs. 145 In roughly half of all sexual assault cases both the
victim and the perpetrator were under the influence of alcohol, which has “effects on sexual and
aggressive behavior, stereotypes about drinking women, and . . . cognitive and motor skills. 146 The
point is not to blame the victim or excuse the offender but rather to highlight how fraught, complex,
and murky sexual violence can be for both parties. 147
Sexual assaults are not all essentially the same. The #MeToo movement, which has raised
awareness of the pervasive problem of sexual assault, has also raised awareness of the many forms it
can take, from a colleague’s “handsiness,” to a date’s unwanted groping, to a completed rape by an
acquaintance to forced oral sex at gunpoint by a stranger. 148 #MeToo has done away with the risible
idea that some level of unwanted sexual touching must be tolerated because it is simply not “serious
enough” to report. 149 At the same time, as more and more people are exposed for committing a wide
array of sexually inappropriate conduct, the shortcomings of the criminal justice system to address the
complexity and nuance of the problem becomes more pronounced. 150 And even when the offenses are
similar or the same, victims differ in their responses.
145

Amy B. Cyphert, The Devil is in the Details: Exploring Restorative Justice as an Option for
Campus Sexual Assault Responses Under Title IX, 96 DENV. L. REV. 51 (2018) (explaining why some
complainants in campus sexual assault cases do not wish to move forward with a campus adjudicatory
process); Sofie Karasek, I’m a Campus Sexual Assault Activist. It’s Time to Reimagine How We
Punish Sex Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2018) (stating that, “putting [the person who assaulted her]
in prison seemed almost laughably ill-suited to what I needed. What I needed was for him to change
his behavior. He needed an intervention, not prison.”).
146
Antonia Abbey et al., Alcohol and Sexual Assault, National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and
Alcoholism (2001), https://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/arh25-1/43-51.htm (stating that the
percentages are “conservative”). “Beliefs about alcohol’s effects on sexual and aggressive behavior,
stereotypes about drinking women, and alcohol’s effects on cognitive and motor skills contribute to
alcohol-involved sexual assault.” Id.
147
Caroline Lippy & Sarah DuGue, Exploring Alcohol Policy Approaches to Prevent Sexual Violence
Perpetration, 17 TRAUMA VIOLENCE & ABUSE 26, 27 (2017) (“Numerous studies have found a direct
association between alcohol use and sexual violence perpetrated in diverse populations, including
high school and college students, adolescents and adult sex offenders, community men and women,
and among individuals in same sex relationships.”); Donna Coker, Crime, Logic, and Campus Sexual
Assault, 49 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 147, 194–95 (2016) (“Victims may experience shame because they
blame themselves for the assault, believing that . . . their drinking was the cause of the assault.”).
148
Ann Hornaday, Enough with Naming and Shaming: It’s Time for Restorative Justice in
Hollywood, WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2018) (describing post #MeToo accusations as ranging from subtle
boundary violations and verbal abuse to outright assault and rape); David Karp et. al., Campus
PRISM: A Report on Promoting Restorative Initiatives for Sexual Misconduct on College Campuses
7 (2016) (defining campus sexual misconduct as “a wide range of offending behaviors such as sexual
harassment, stalking, sexual assault, and intimate partner violence”).
149
Nora Stewart, The Light We Shine into The Grey: A Restorative #MeToo Solution and an
Acknowledgement of Those #MeToo Leaves in the Dark, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1693, 1694 (2019).
150
Andrew Dalton, One Year on From #MeToo, Sexual Misconduct Prosecutions are Still Rare in
Hollywood, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/metoo-hollywood-sexual-misconduct-prosecutions-weinstein-cosby-spacey-a8572066.html (reporting
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The victims’ rights movement purports to speak for all victims, but it fails to take their
multiplicity of needs into account. If the goal is to make victims central in the process of confronting,
assessing, and meting out consequences for the harm done, those with power and influence—
prosecutors, victims’ rights advocates, and other advocacy groups—need to provide victims with
alternatives, not an all-or-nothing choice. 151 Better understanding what a particular victim needs in a
particular situation may call for the appointment of pro bono counsel so that, like the accused, the
victim has someone solely devoted to advocating for her interests. 152 Better understanding the needs
of victims also calls for less coerciveness and stereotyped thinking, and more openness on the part of
prosecutors and victims’ rights advocates.
Under our current system, victims who report their sexual assaults to the police are presented at
most with two options: the potential for a criminal conviction, which may or may not be realized, or
nothing at all. 153 This one-size-fits-all-approach approach is incomplete and ill-suited to many
situations no matter the race or socio-economic class or sexual orientation of the victim, and no
matter what kind of assault was involved. 154 At its most functional, the criminal justice system makes
victims passive actors in supporting roles. 155 The trauma they experience is not only due to re-living
the event and experiencing intrusions into their personal history, it is also due to their lack of control
over the legal process. Their participation at trial is dictated by the prosecutor and the focus at all
times is squarely on the offender. While a victim impact statement allows victims to try to influence
the sentence, the focus is only on consequences and is “presented too late in the justice process to
offer victims any real sense of control.” 156 No wonder then that so many victims feel disempowered,
that the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office was considering charges in six cases but citing
complications including statutes of limitation and lack of “hard evidence”).
151
C. Quince Hopkins, Mary P. Koss & Karen J. Bachar, Applying Restorative Justice Practices to
Ongoing Intimate Violence: Problems and Possibilities, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 289, 291
(2004) (stating that “existing remedies are problematic because they often base relief on an
essentialized conception of a victim” when some victims may not want jail or prison) [hereinafter
Quince et al., Applying Restorative Justice Practices].
152
Merle H. Weiner, Legal Counsel For Survivors of Campus Sexual Violence, 29 YALE J. LAW &
FEMINISM 123, 156 (2017) (arguing that sexual assault victims need separate counsel because
prosecutors cannot be counted upon to represent the interests of the victim “especially if the victim’s
needs conflict with the prosecutor’s effort to obtain a conviction”); Erin Gardner Schenk & David L.
Shakes, Into the Blue Yonder of Legal Representation of Victims of Sexual Assault: Can U.S. State
Courts Learn from the Military?, 6 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2016) (arguing that criminal
courts should import the military’s procedure of appointing special counsel to represent the interests
of sexual assault victims).
153
Michelle Alexander, Reckoning with Violence, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/03/opinion/violence-criminal-justice.html; Donna Coker, Crime,
Logic, and Campus Sexual Assault, 49 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 147, 161 (2016).
154
Linda G. Mills, The Justice of Recovery: How the State Can Heal Victims of Crime, 57 HASTINGS
L.J. 457, 458 (2006).
155
Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal
Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 136 (2004).
156
Linda G. Mills, The Justice of Recovery: How the State Can Heal Victims of Crime, 57 HASTINGS
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sidelined, and even erased. 157 By emphasizing retribution over all else, the criminal process leaves
some victims unsatisfied and others worse off. 158
IV.

An Alternative Approach

There are victims of sexual assault who could benefit from a different approach 159—indeed,
there is an argument that it is unethical not to provide one, given the documented failure of the
criminal process. 160 Victims need “a more comprehensive menu of options to facilitate their recovery
from crime.” 161 What many want is an opportunity to tell their story under their own power,
validation of their suffering, accountability from the offender, a promise of change moving forward,
and an agreed upon means of repairing the harm done to the victim and to the community. 162 For
some victims, that means voluntarily engaging in a restorative justice process, which can take a
variety of forms, including mediated victim-offender dialogues, healing circles, and other, more
indirect ways of engagement that offer an opportunity for victims to tell their stories in their own
voices under their own agency. 163
At the heart of the restorative approach is the offender’s acknowledgement of causing harm
and validation of the victim’s suffering, a reckoning with the offending behavior that involves
reflection and insight, a commitment not to re-offend, and an agreed-upon means of holding the
person accountable. 164 Some victims want solely, or additionally, restitution, a public apology,
access to counseling, and additional measures such as securing safe housing or civil protective
orders. 165 Author and restorative justice practitioner Danielle Sered found that when given a choice,
“Do you want this [different kind of] intervention or prison?,” ninety percent of survivors of violent
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crime in New York City chose the restorative path offered by her organization, Common Justice. 166
While victims of sexual assault are a diverse group, many share a common objective:
assurance that the person who harmed them will not go on to harm more people. 167 While at first
look, it may seem that criminal punishment is a means to achieving that end, it often is not. The
criminogenic effect of prison has been well documented: we know that people who go to prison,
particularly maximum security prisons for serious violent crimes, can emerge hardened and more
violent than when they entered. 168 Nor do most prisons offer the programmatic and educational
opportunities for the insight and self-reflection that are necessary for offenders to grapple with their
sexually violent behavior—including hearing directly from the victim or surrogate victims— and take
the steps necessary to change that behavior. 169
What if victims of sexual assault had an alternative that would help them heal, hold offenders
accountable, and keep them and their communities safe? Established programs have demonstrated
that restorative justice, rigorously applied, is one such alternative even in cases involving extreme
violence. 170 Scholars and psychologists have argued that it makes little sense to exclude sexual
assault cases from programs like these, which are survivor-centered and address criminal acts that are
deeply and personally violative. 171 Such a program, like all restorative programs, depends on the
voluntary participation of victims, and not all victims will want to engage with it. 172 But the data
suggest that many do, and that restorative justice, unlike criminal justice, is more effective in
addressing the root causes of violent crime, making victims whole, reknitting communities, and
reducing recidivism. 173 Insofar as prosecutors seek to do what is best for crime victims, victims of
166
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sexual assault who would prefer a non-adjudicative and non-punitive alternative such as a restorative
justice process should have that option because it empowers them, helps them heal, and aligns with
prosecutorial objectives. Of course, victims do not exercise veto power within the system, and
prosecutors may believe in individual cases that other public interests, such as public safety, should
take precedence over doing what is in the victim’s best interest. Ultimately, it is up to the prosecutor
to decide what course of action to take. But barring exceptional cases – for example, cases involving
repeat, violent sexual offenders – there is nothing to suggest that a prosecutor who is giving priority
to the victim’s interests should not honor a victim’s restorative justice preference.
The use of restorative justice in sexual assault cases, however, is a rarity, in part because
victims’ rights advocates believe it lets offenders off the hook too easily and will fail to deter them
from re-offending, and that communities are safer when those who commit sexual offenses are locked
up. 174 In fact, the limited data available shows otherwise: in Australia, which applies restorative
justice practices in juvenile sexual assault cases, an empirical study of 232 cases showed that “violent
crime offenders whose cases were handled through restorative justice practices were 40% less likely
to reoffend than those whose cases went through the criminal justice system.” 175 Prosecutors inclined
to skepticism when asked to adopt a restorative justice approach 176 should also pause and consider
how the current system has failed and continues to fail victims and society at large, thus undermining
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the prosecutors’ “do justice” mandate. 177 In 2009-2010, the most recent years for which federal data
were available, only 32 percent of rapes and sexual assaults were reported to the police. 178 Of that
number, only 5.7 percent resulted in arrests, 1.1 percent were referred for prosecution, and .07 percent
led to a conviction. 179 In short, fewer than 1 percent of rape allegations result in a criminal
conviction. By contrast, the trauma experienced by the victims can be severe, with 75 percent
reporting psychological problems including PTSD, anxiety, depression, and fear. 180
We do not argue that restorative justice should supplant the existing criminal justice process,
only that in some cases, where there is not a paramount need to incapacitate a dangerous offender or
some other countervailing public interest that should take precedence, it should be offered to victims
as an alternative. While existing programs that use restorative justice in cases of extreme
interpersonal violence in the United States are limited, the few that exist show promise. Sered’s
organization, Common Justice, was created in 2008 by the Vera Institute in partnership with the
Kings County District Attorney’s Office in Brooklyn. 181 While the program does not include
offenders accused of sex crimes, many of its participants have committed extremely serious crimes
including shootings, stabbings, and other violent assaults. If, and only if, the victims agree to
participate, they will come together—or use a surrogate to represent them—with the perpetrator “and
family and community members with a stake in the outcome.” 182 The victims are free to reject the
Common Justice alternative, in which case the offenders will go through the court process, and if
convicted, serve prison sentences. 183
One might expect, given the victims’ rights narrative about “what victims want,” that most
victims would reject what Common Justice offers them. 184 But ninety percent of victims choose the
program over the traditional criminal justice process even though offenders will not be sent to prison
and will have their felony conviction removed following successful completion of the program. By
177
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2018, Sered wrote, the number of offenders who engaged in her program had a recidivism rate of only
six percent. From 2012-2018, Common Justice expelled only one person from the program for
committing a new crime. 185
To offer another example: RESTORE, a federally-funded program that operated in Pima
County, Arizona from 2004-2007, 186 worked collaboratively with local prosecutors to offer victims of
felony and misdemeanor sexual assaults the opportunity to choose a restorative justice alternative
over the traditional criminal process. 187 Sexual offenses ranged from rape to indecent exposure. 188
The majority of victims offered this choice accepted the opportunity to participate in RESTORE.
Participation in RESTORE required victims and offenders to participate in a restorative justice
conferencing process overseen by program personnel and a facilitator, together with family and
supporters. 189 Victims described how the assault had impacted their lives and the lives of their
friends and family. 190 Offenders took responsibility for committing the assault and also participated
in active listening by putting the victims’ story into their own words, with the victims correcting them
when necessary. 191 Offenders were held to account through mandatory participation in sex offender
therapy, substance abuse treatment where warranted, regular meetings and check-ins with case
managers, community service, and restitution. 192
A study of the program found that of the 22 cases accepted over a three-year period, “[t]wo
thirds of felony and 91% of misdemeanor” offenders successfully completed the program. Two
offenders were terminated from the program because homelessness, substance abuse or financial
problems prevented them from complying with the requirements; one offender withdraw after
reversing himself and denying responsibility. 193 More than 90 percent of the victims who participated
stated that they “were satisfied that justice was done.” 194 The percentage of victims suffering from
PTSD dropped from 82% to 66% after completing the program. 195 The percentage of participants
who “felt safe, listened to, supported, treated fairly, treated with respect, and not expected to do more
than they anticipated” exceeded ninety percent. 196
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RESTORE and Common Justice are just two programs in two counties, but their results teach
important lessons. First, the under-utilization and selective application of restorative justice practices
should be re-examined. Traditionally, restorative justice has been reserved as an alternative only in
cases involving juveniles or only for low-level non-violent offenses. 197 Studies and successful
programs such as Common Justice and RESTORE have demonstrated that restorative justice
programs founded on principles of victim-centeredness and offender accountability with a focus on
rigor, repair, and community involvement are suited to all crimes, including those involving violence.
Moreover, it is possible to implement a restorative justice alternative with the cooperation and support
of prosecutors who recognize that restorative outcomes promote public safety and serve victims.
RESTORE’s partnership with a willing Pima County District Attorney’s Office, and Common
Justice’s partnership with the King’s County District Attorney’s Office, which is now more than a
decade-old, demonstrates that such partnerships are not only possible but successful and durable. 198
In sum, the failure of the traditional criminal justice system to serve many victims’ needs and
serve justice in sexual assault cases demands a new approach. As we have discussed, the vast
majority of sexual assault cases go unreported and unprosecuted. Few result in convictions. Most
sexual assault cases involve people who know each other. Most victimizers were victims themselves
at one point. 199 These data points suggest that a restorative, reparative approach holds more promise
both for healing, in the case of victims, and reckoning, in the case of offenders. Sexual violence rips
apart communities and the lives of individuals: left to fester—whether through neglect or through the
incapacitation of the offender in a criminogenic environment that allows the victim no peace or
safety—it infects future generations. 200 Ending this particular cycle of violence should be no
different than ending the cycles of violence that lead to muggings, robberies, stabbings, and
shootings. True respect, care, and advocacy for victims necessarily means offering them this
alternative, which is centered on their needs and designed to empower them to have those needs met.
CONCLUSION
The victims’ rights movement has altered the legal landscape. It has changed the way in
which sexual assault crimes are charged, prosecuted, and punished. These reforms have been
procedural and substantive. Victims have important procedural rights within the criminal process: to
be kept up to date on the progression of their offenders’ cases, to seek restitution, and to make a
victim impact statement, among others. Victims of sexual assault in particular have seen important
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reforms. Rape victims are no longer required to prove that they actively resisted or sustained physical
injury. A spousal relationship is no longer a defense to a rape charge. But despite these groundshifting reforms, sexual assault prosecutions remain infrequent and largely unsuccessful. When cases
are tried, victims may be frustrated or even re-traumatized, because they have no control, they cannot
tell their stories their own way, their conduct is mischaracterized, their lives may be put under a
microscope, and they have no right to assigned counsel to advise them and advocate for them in the
process. Even the “best case” outcomes in which the offender is punished and receives a lengthy
sentence provide little if any solace or healing.
Restorative justice may offer the best hope of vindicating victims’ rights by providing them
with what they need most: validation, acknowledgement, empowerment, reckoning, and
accountability. The United States has been slow to embrace restorative justice in any context, and
particularly in sexual assault cases, because we are wedded to the criminal process and criminal
punishment, particularly when it comes to intimate acts of violence. We suggest that it is past time to
rethink that approach. The criminal process is a failure for many victims, who are not healed, for
many offenders, who are not deterred, and for society, which bears the cost of mass incarceration: the
devastation of communities, the recidivism rates, and the ever-widening circle of harm as offending
behavior, left unaddressed, is passed from one generation to the next. True victim advocacy requires
reckoning with these harsh realities and exploring a different approach—not as a replacement, but as
an alternative. True victims’ rights advocacy focuses on what victims themselves want rather than
the embrace of tough-on-crime narratives that serve as little more than ill-kept or empty promises.
What victims want may well be what restorative justice has to offer. It is time to give it more serious
consideration.
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